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We investigate which political institutions will improve the delivery of public goods in decentralized systems.
We begin with a formal extension of Oates’ influential “decentralization theorem” to include the presence of
inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Our new model, which we term the “strong decentralization theorem,” indicates
that, when spillovers are present, the impact of decentralization will depend on the structure of a country’s
political system. More specifically, our model suggests that the interaction of democratic decentralization (the
presence of popularly elected sub-national governments) and party centralization (the power of national party
leaders over sub-national office-seekers) will produce the best outcomes. To test this argument empirically, we
develop a new dataset of sub-national political institutions. Our analyses, which examine educational and health
service delivery in 135 countries across 30 years, provide support for our theoretical expectations. (JEL D61,
D72, D78, H73, H75)
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1.

Introduction

As more and more of the world’s states devolve power and resources to sub-national governments,
decentralization has emerged as one of the most important global trends of the new century. Yet there is still no
consensus concerning the benefits of decentralization and how to design institutions that can realize these
benefits. In this paper, we investigate the political conditions under which this trend towards decentralization
will improve the delivery of public goods. We begin by incorporating insights from political science and
economics into a rigorous and formal extension of the “decentralization theorem.” This theorem, which points
to the efficiency benefits of the sub-national provision of public goods, was first developed by Oates (1972) and
has influenced virtually all of the literature over the past four decades.
In his theorem, Oates assumes, among other things, the absence of inter-jurisdictional spillovers in the
centralized provision of local public goods. Our extension goes beyond Oates by producing a “strong
decentralization theorem” that identifies the political conditions under which the provision of local public goods
by a system of sub-national governments is welfare superior to centralized provision even under spillovers of
local public spending. More specifically, it finds that these beneficial outcomes for public service delivery will
hold when democratic decentralization (i.e. the creation of popularly elected sub-national governments) is
combined with party centralization (i.e. the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for subnational office). Democratic decentralization creates the accountability necessary for efficient public goods
provision, while party centralization increases local governments’ incentives to provide the optimal levels of
public goods with spillover effects. In summary, our theory shows that political institutions may matter
considerably in determining the efficiency of decentralization outcomes.
To test these arguments empirically, we make use of a new dataset of sub-national political institutions
created for this project. Up to this point, scholars interested in sub-national political institutions have been
forced to focus on single cases (especially the United States) or to assume that national-level political
institutions are replicated at the sub-national level. Our new dataset allows us to examine how the structure of
sub-national political institutions influences educational and health outcomes (our proxies for public goods
2

provision) in 135 countries across 30 years. This empirical analysis, to our knowledge the broadest quantitative
exploration of sub-national politics in the literature, provides solid support for our theoretical expectations.
This paper demonstrates for the first time that the decentralization theorem, which lies at the heart of our
understanding of sub-national government, is dependent on the structure of political institutions once the
unrealistic assumption of no inter-jurisdictional spillovers is relaxed. Local elections and certain forms of party
institutions must be in place before we can expect decentralization to deliver on its promises. This finding has
very significant implications for the scholarly understanding of decentralization among both economists and
political scientists. It helps make sense of the mixed findings that characterize the empirical scholarship on
decentralization while adding clarity and detail to the theoretical literature. And, for development practitioners,
it has the potential to encourage a deeper examination of the types of political institutions that may be necessary
for decentralization reforms to produce fuller results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the pertinent literature. Section three
discusses the basic intuition behind our analysis. Section four develops the formal theoretical model and results.
Section five presents our empirical analysis and our results. Section six concludes.

2.

Review of the Literature
As noted above, decentralization has become a prominent global trend; countries which have engaged in

decentralization reforms include China, Indonesia, South Africa, India, the United Kingdom, and many others.
These reforms, at least in the developing world, have been supported both by the aid dollars of multilateral and
bilateral agencies such as the World Bank and USAID, and by the research findings of many scholars. Central
to these positive scholarly judgments is the “decentralization theorem,” which was developed by Oates (1972)
and states that “. . . in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a (local public) good and of
inter-jurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if
Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of
consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions”(p.54).
3

As the process of decentralization has continued apace, however, some scholars have begun to question
whether devolving authority to regional and local governments is a universal good. Among other things, they
have pointed out that Oates, in developing his theorem, assumed a benevolent, welfare-maximizing
government. While this assumption may have been useful for creating a simple and elegant theory of
decentralization, it hardly accords with empirical realities. More to the point, it begs the question of how
different political processes and institutions might shape the fiscal choices made by policy makers. While these
problems have been increasingly acknowledged and confronted in the “second generation” research on
decentralization, there is still little systematic work on which political institutions lead to the social welfare
gains expected of decentralization by Oates (1972).2 Instead, this second generation of scholarship, which
relaxes the assumption of benevolent government, has tended to focus on the problems of assignment and soft
budget constraints rather than on the relationship between specific political institutions and the provision of
local public goods.
We begin our exploration of the existing literature with an examination of what economists and political
scientists (sometimes on parallel tracks) have said about decentralization and its efficiency implications. We
then move to the broader literature on political institutions, party organization, and public goods provision,
nearly all of which has developed with reference to national governments and apart from the study of
decentralization. We conclude our review of the literature by highlighting the relative absence of work that
considers how specific political institutions such as electoral rules and local representation might mediate the
effects of decentralization on efficiency outcomes.
Modern research on decentralization began with Tiebout’s landmark 1956 study, which argued that a
decentralized system of public service delivery can maximize efficiency by allowing government services to
vary according to the preferences of citizens in different jurisdictions. Oates picked up on this idea and
qualified it in his 1972 formulation of the decentralization theorem, and scholars have since spent significant
time improving or critiquing his argument and testing its empirical merit. For example, Breton (2002),

2
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Treisman (2007), Lockwood (2002), and Besley and Coate (2003) have examined whether central governments
could themselves target public goods delivery to regional preferences, while Bardhan (2002) and Manor (1999)
are skeptical that individuals will move to regions that provide the policies they prefer. Others assert that
decentralization increases opportunities for corruption (Treisman 2000, 2007; Tanzi 2002) and can be counterproductive if sub-national civil servants are not sufficiently professionalized (Shah 2003, Manor 1999).
Another group of economists (e.g. Weingast 1995) emphasizes the utility of decentralization because it
generates a healthy competition among jurisdictions. Those that are most efficient at public goods delivery will
attract new citizens, they argue, whereas those that govern poorly will find their populations and tax bases
shriveled. Of course, like the arguments made by Tiebout and Oates, this contention has attracted its share of
critics, especially among those who fear that decentralization could produce an inequitable distribution of goods
(Prud’Homme 1995), exacerbate regional enmities (Treisman 1999, von Braun and Grote 2002), or lead to local
elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Many scholars are also concerned about the possible negative
impact of decentralization for a country’s fiscal balances. For example, Treisman (2000) and Wibbels (2000)
find an empirical connection between federalism and inflation.
Despite the critics, most scholarship in economics and political science, following in the tradition of
Tiebout, Oates, and Weingast, has viewed decentralization positively. For example, many scholars believe that
decentralization has a salutary effect on corruption by promoting transparency and accountability (Manor 1999,
Gurgur and Shah 2002, Crook 2003). Others have highlighted ways in which some of the potential drawbacks
of decentralization can be alleviated. For example, Rodden (2006) recommends that central governments
follow a no-bailout policy without respect to sub-national authorities, thereby forcing them to internalize the
consequences of their fiscal behavior.
On the empirical side, evidence for the proposed link between decentralization and efficiency has been
mixed. Among the skeptics, Davoodi and Zou (1998) believe that devolving power to sub-national
governments slows economic growth in developing countries, Parry (1997) is skeptical that decentralization in
Chile has improved educational outcomes, and, more recently, Malesky, Nguyen, and Tran (2014) find that
5

public service provision mostly improved after the abolition of district-level representative councils in Vietnam.
On the positive side, Lewis (1998) associates improved water delivery with decentralization in Kenya and
Habibi et al. (2003) point to evidence that strong sub-national government reduced infant mortality in
Argentina. Studies of Bolivia (Faguet and Sanchez 2008), Argentina (Habibi et al. 2003), and Indonesia
(Simatupang 2009), as well as cross-national quantitative analyses (Heredia 2006), also point to improved
educational outcomes with decentralization.
A reasonable summary, then, is that most scholars continue to see decentralization as a route to
improving the delivery of public goods, but with a number of significant caveats (see Hankla 2009). If the
benefits of decentralization are indeed conditional on other factors, something that many scholars are beginning
to suspect, it could help account for the mixed empirical findings outlined above. Thus far, however, the
literature has spent little time considering how political institutions might matter in mediating the effects of
devolving power to sub-national governments. To lay the groundwork for incorporating these institutions into
our argument, we turn now to a consideration of the broader literature on institutions and governance in political
science.
Political scientists have long investigated the implications of different institutional configurations for the
delivery of public goods, although their efforts have focused almost exclusively on national governments. Most
scholars in this area agree, at least implicitly, that the political institutions likely to produce positive outcomes
are those which expose leaders to popular democratic pressures while insulating them from particularistic
interest groups. In making variations of this broad argument, researchers have investigated the impact of a
number of specific institutions (e.g., electoral systems, legislative-executive relations, legislative and coalition
party fragmentation) on a wide variety of policy outcomes (e.g., free trade, balanced budgets, energy
conservation). To take some examples, political scientists have found evidence that strong, democratic
executives are more likely to provide public goods such as free trade (O’Halloran 1994, Nielson 2003),
economic liberalization (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), and balanced budgets (Hallerberg and Marier 2004) than
their less insulated counterparts. In addition, many scholars have associated balanced budgets with low levels
6

of legislative and governmental party fragmentation (e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, Volkerink and de Haan
2001).
The impact of political party organization on policy outcomes, one of the central concerns of this article,
has been much less thoroughly explored in the literature. The little research that has considered party
organization has linked a more centralized structure (with empowered national elites) to public goods provision.
Hankla (2006) and Nielson (2003), for example, argue that democracies with centralized political parties are
more likely to adopt free trade policies, and Hallerberg and Marier (2004) find a connection between centralized
parties and balanced budgets in Latin America. Similarly, Hicken and Simmons (2008) argue that that
education spending undertaken by decentralized parties is more particularistic and less effective. The link is
simply that party centralization shifts power from local elites, who might be tempted to shore-up their support
with particularistic goods, to national party leaders, who have electoral incentives to consider the aggregate
national interest.
While nearly all of the research relating party structures with public goods delivery concerns the
national level, some scholars have investigated the causal relationship between party and party system
centralization on the one hand and the empowerment of sub-national governments on the other. For example,
Chhibber and Kollman (2004) make the case that countries devolving more powers to the subnational level are
likely to have more localized party systems, while Fabre et al. (2005) find that such countries will also be
characterized by more decentralized parties. Garman, Haggard, and Willis (2001) argue for the same
relationship moving in the opposite direction; for them the decentralization of parties is likely to drive greater
fiscal decentralization. By contrast, Eaton (2004) and Dickovick (2011) find that the choice to empower subnational governments can be driven by the incentives of national party leaders.
Other scholars have addressed the question of whether and how party structures can contribute to (or
undermine) the stability of federalism. Undoubtedly William Riker is the most prominent scholar to have taken
up this question, arguing in his classic 1964 book that party centralization is among the most important
determinants of federal centralization as a whole. Extending that argument to the United States, Riker contends
7

in his 1987 book that the American “decentralized party system is the main protector of the integrity of states in
our federalism” (p. 221).3 By contrast, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004) emphasize the benefits of
more integrated parties, making the case that party systems which successfully link the national and subnational levels of government are the best guarantors of a stable federal system. Myerson (2006) concurs,
arguing that regional and local elections provide opportunities for potential national candidates to prove
themselves at the sub-national level.
While all of these scholars have improved our understanding of how partisan and sub-national
institutions interact, their focus has not been on connecting particular sub-national political institutions with
public goods provision. Indeed, there are very few systematic studies in the literature that make this connection,
but it is worth highlighting four influential analyses here. First, Riker, in his 1964 study, suggests that
decentralized parties could be both a driver of democratic decentralization and a protector of the benefits of
federalism. Second, Erik Wibbels argues in his 2005 book that the presence of centralized parties facilitates the
efforts of national leaders to push sub-national governments into market reforms. Third, Hecock (2006) finds a
positive relationship between sub-national political competition and educational spending in Mexico. Finally,
and perhaps most related to our own work, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) conclude, after a cross-national
empirical study, that devolving fiscal authority to sub-national governments is more likely to improve public
goods (in this case, education) delivery when parties are centralized.
Despite some overlap with our interests here, however, there are a number of significant differences
between our argument and those set forth by these scholars. Turning first to Riker, he is primarily concerned
with the causal relationship between party and democratic decentralization, rather than with the combinations of
the two that would best generate public goods. Wibbels (2005), for his part, focuses on party centralization as a
means of national control within a decentralized political system, and not on the incentives such structures
create for internalizing externalities. In a similar vein, Hecock (2006) is more interested in the level of partisan
competition than in the questions of party organization that we study here.

3
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Moreover, in contrast to Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya’s important and well-executed 2007 study, we
consider here the interaction between party centralization and democratic decentralization rather than that
between party centralization and fiscal decentralization, and so our theory is significantly different. To be more
specific, Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya do not consider, as we do, whether sub-national governments are elected,
but focus instead on whether they are fiscally empowered. This is certainly an important factor, but previous
work has indicated that the accountability that comes with democratic elections is very likely necessary to
improve governance outcomes (i.e. Manor 1999). For that reason, we choose to examine the significant crossnational variation in sub-national democracy that exists in the world, making the assumption that democratically
decentralized governments are also fiscally decentralized.4 Further, as we discuss below, our empirical section
directly operationalizes the concept of democratic decentralization and provides a clear test for our specific
arguments.
Another, perhaps more important, difference between our paper and that of Enikolopov and
Zhuravshaya (2007) is that we develop our argument formally using the decentralization theorem as a base, an
approach which gives us more opportunity to leave our mark on the fundamental theory of decentralization. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to identify formally the precise political conditions under which the
decentralization theorem, which has been at the center of research in fiscal federalism for decades, should hold.
On the empirical side, we believe that our dataset, which measures party decentralization more directly
and at the sub-national level, hews more closely to theory. Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya do not observe
political centralization directly but rather use two proxies: i) the age of the main parties (the older the more
centralized), and ii) the fractionalization of the party system (the higher the less centralized). While these
proxies were undoubtedly the best indicators available to them at the time, they are quite problematic. There is
little reason to believe, for example, that party age should correlate closely to party centralization. Party
centralization is largely a function of a country’s specific political institutions, including its electoral system, its

The reverse case – that fiscally decentralized systems are generally democratically decentralized – is not likely to hold, as the
prominent contemporary cases of Vietnam and China clearly show.
4
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degree of federalism, and its candidate nomination procedures, rather than a result of its political development.
For instance, many scholars, beginning with Riker in 1964, have classified America’s two major parties as
decentralized because of their lack of party unity at the national level and because primaries determine their
nomination decisions. These parties are, of course, among the oldest in the world. By contrast, many new
democracies have centralized parties that are dominated by a highly charismatic leader.
A country’s party system fractionalization, its effective number of parties, is also a problematic proxy
for its party centralization. The reason is that fractionalization is measured at the party system level, not the
party level. It is entirely possible, and indeed common, for decentralized parties to form a low fractionalized
party system, and for centralized parties to join together in a highly fractionalized party system. The United
States is an example of the first contrary case, while Mexico, the Netherlands, and many other countries fall into
the second. As a result, it is clear that a higher number of effective parties does not necessarily lead to more
decentralized parties, as Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya assume. Our new dataset, which measures party
(de)centralization using the power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for sub-national office, is
coded at the sub-national party level and therefore represents a much more direct measure of the underlying
concepts.5
To summarize, then, the purpose of our research is to merge insights from political science with the
decentralization literature outlined above, all to identify the political conditions needed for realizing the benefits
of decentralization. We turn to developing our theory in the next section.

3

Theoretical Framework and Basic Intuition
In developing our theory, we begin with the decentralization theorem (Oates 1972) and expand it

formally by relaxing the assumption of no inter-jurisdictional spillovers and then addressing the implications of

Empirically, we also improve on Enikolopov and Zhuravshaya’s work by using control variables for political institutions at the subnational level and educational indicators for the dependent variables that pick-up more directly on educational outcomes.
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different institutional configurations for its efficiency predictions. More specifically, we consider four distinct
cases:
(1) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have democratically elected sub-national
governments) and party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to select candidates for these
sub-national elections);
(2) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments) but
party decentralized (i.e. national leaders lack the power to nominate candidates for constituency
elections to the national legislature);
(3) countries that are democratically decentralized (i.e. they have elected sub-national governments) but
party centralized (i.e. national party leaders select candidates for sub-national elections); and
(4) countries that are democratically centralized (i.e. they have no elected sub-national governments) and
party centralized (i.e. national party leaders nominate candidates to constituency elections for the
national legislature).

Our notion of what constitutes a centralized party is the same regardless of the electoral system used in a
country. For us, a party is centralized when its national party leaders control access to the party name in local
elections. For space reasons, we focus our formal analysis in this paper on majoritarian, single-member-district
systems, defining decentralized parties as those that hold open or closed primaries (modeled separately) to
choose candidates, as opposed to those having national party leaders nominate them. While we understand that
many decentralized parties practice free candidate nomination procedures (i.e. by collecting signatures or
paying a fee) rather than primaries, we believe these decentralized structures will have many of the same effects
as primaries (see Carey and Shugart 1995).
In a related paper, we also develop a formal model examining the same relationships for democracies
that use proportional representation (PR) systems (Ponce-Rodriguez et al. 2015). While the underlying
structure of this model is the same as that presented here, our purpose was to ensure that the unique party
11

structures that different electoral systems can incentivize have no impact on our hypothesized relationships. In
our PR model, we define decentralized parties as those that use open lists, a variant of PR that allows voters to
select the individual candidates that they prefer. We model centralized parties, on the other hand, as those using
closed lists. Within open list systems, we also consider the effect of more versus less central party involvement
in selecting candidates, which allows us to make more fine distinctions in the level of centralization that we
model.
In our models, we extend the decentralization theorem by incorporating inter-jurisdictional spillovers,
which as mentioned above were explicitly excluded by Oates, and find that the benefits of decentralization
continue to hold provided that democratic decentralization is combined with party centralization. We call this
our “strong decentralization theorem.”
To be more specific, in the majoritarian system models that are our focus here, both the conventional
decentralization theorem (which assumes away spillovers) and the strong decentralization theorem hold when
parties are centralized. Under these circumstances, local public goods allocation will be more efficient when
provided by a system of elected local governments, even in the presence of spillover effects. When parties are
decentralized, however, the delivery of public goods by local governments is only consistently better when
there are no externalities. In other words, the strong decentralization theorem does not generally hold for
democracies with party decentralization because primary elections do not create incentives for local politicians
to internalize inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Again, party centralization in this context is measured as central
party nomination of candidates, while party decentralization is measured as the presence of primaries.6
Our proportional system model, detailed in Ponce-Rodriguez et al. (2015), obtains nearly identical
findings. In democracies using closed list systems, our measure of party centralization, both the standard and
the strong decentralization theorems hold. In these cases, the creation of local elected local governments will
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improve local public goods delivery, even when there are spillover effects. This is also the case in more
centralized forms of open list systems. By contrast, in countries where decentralized forms of open list systems
are used, only the conventional decentralization theorem will hold. Any improvement in public goods delivery
that may come from the creation of local government will depend on whether externalities are present.
The intuition of these models is, first, that democratic decentralization, by increasing both accountability
and access to local information, produces incentives on the part of politicians to provide citizens with the bundle
of public goods that they desire. In other words, as Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) point out, polities with
elected sub-national governments can better target public services to the needs and preferences of their
constituents, allowing bundles of goods to vary across constituency. Of course, having these governments
democratically elected is the key to ensuring that they are responsive to citizen desires (Bird and Vaillancourt
1998, Manor 1999).
Second, party centralization has the contrasting benefit of increasing the chances that any externalities
from local public goods will be internalized. A common concern about democratic and fiscal decentralization is
that local governments will under-provide public goods with beneficial spillovers beyond their constituencies
(e.g., Bird et al. 2003). This is because these governments are unable to internalize and profit from the political
rewards of providing these goods optimally. The “rational” policy is instead to ignore the benefits that arise in
other jurisdictions and/or to free-ride on the expenditures of neighboring governments; in either case the
production of public goods will not be optimal. A number of basic public services, such as primary health,
general education, water treatment and environmental protection, are likely to generate spillover effects and
may not receive sufficient financing from local governments.7
When parties are centralized, however, sub-national elected leaders do have incentives to provide more
public goods with benefits that spillover into neighboring constituencies. National party leaders will be
interested in generating optimal levels of public goods with spillover effects because they are concerned with

7
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their party’s prospects in the country as a whole. In centralized parties, these national leaders have significant
powers, not least nomination powers over sub-national politicians, and therefore can push them to optimally
supply these goods.
To summarize, sub-national leaders in systems with democratic decentralization and party centralization
have two masters whose interests are sometimes in competition, namely party chiefs in the national capital and
local voters in their constituencies. Without the former, these leaders cannot be nominated and without the
latter they cannot be elected. These competing loyalties produce incentives both to provide differentiated local
public goods and to spend more money on goods with spillover effects. As a result, our argument is that
systems that mix democratic decentralization with party centralization will have the best outcomes from the
perspective of the optimal supply of local public goods, other things equal. Systems that are centralized in both
ways lack sufficient incentives to differentiate and target goods to local preferences, and systems that are
decentralized in both dimensions have little incentive to generate optimal levels of public goods with
geographical externalities.
A final question is whether countries that mix centralization and decentralization in the reverse way,
those with no locally elected governments but with decentralized parties, might be able to produce the same
beneficial tension. We think not. Even if politicians elected to the national legislature from local districts have
incentives to concern themselves with local preferences, their ability to force the central government to
differentiate tax and spending bundles for their constituents will be limited. Moreover, theoretical models
developed by Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) indicate that, while central governments may
provide different constituencies with different bundles of public goods, a more decentralized approach to
decision-making is likely to produce more efficient differentiation.

4

The Formal Model
In this section, we present our formal expansion of the decentralization theorem, focusing on

democracies using majoritarian electoral systems. As noted above, we have also modeled similar relationships
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for PR systems, which, for space reasons, we present only in Ponce-Rodriguez et al. (2015). In essence,
however, the logic of the theory, as noted above, is the same for both systems, as is the basic intuition of what
constitutes a centralized party. Whether a democracy uses a majoritarian or a proportional electoral system, we
consider that country’s parties to be centralized when national party leaders control nominations to local office.
In presenting our formal model, we take a sequential approach: first, we develop a comparative analysis
of the welfare properties of the democratically (de)centralized provision of local public goods for economies
with party centralization. To do so, we provide two models of electoral competition with party centralization:
the first model considers that local public goods are provided by a central government. In the second model
local pubic goods are supplied by a system of local governments.8 This comparative analysis leads to one of our
main theoretical findings: the “strong decentralization theorem” which identifies conditions in which a system
of local governments welfare-dominates the provision of local public goods (relative the fiscally centralized
provision) even if local public goods show inter-jurisdictional spillovers.
Second, we also develop a comparative analysis of the welfare properties of the democratically
(de)centralized provision of local public goods for economies with party decentralization. Again, we develop
two models of electoral competition with party decentralization: in the first model local public goods are
centrally provided while the second model considers decentralization. This comparative analysis shows that the
strong decentralization theorem does not hold for economies with party decentralized systems. However, we
also show that the conventional decentralization theorem (as identified originally by Oates 1972) holds for
economies with decentralized party systems that use open primaries but fails to hold for decentralized party
systems that use closed primaries.

4.1

The Benchmark and Definitions

8
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We begin by characterizing the set of local public goods that maximize aggregate public goods surplus.
This will provide us with a metric for the comparative analysis of the welfare properties of the centralized and
decentralized provision of local public goods. This approach to benchmarking our results allows us to compare
them to those in the normative analysis of Oates (1972) and the more recent political economy analyses of
Besley and Coate (2003) and Lookwood (2008).
Consider an economy composed of districts 𝑖 and – 𝑖 with 𝑛𝑖 = 1,2 … … 𝑁 individuals in each district.
Individuals do not have mobility across jurisdictions. The preferences of an individual with an endowment 𝑒 𝑖
in district 𝑖 is 𝜐 𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑖 ) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜇 𝑖 (𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔−𝑖 ) = 𝑥 𝑖 𝐺 𝑖 subject to 𝑎) 𝑥 𝑖 = 𝑒 𝑖 − 𝑡 𝑖 and 𝑏) 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑁𝑡 𝑖 ∀𝑖, where
𝜐 𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑖 ) is the individual´s indirect utility, 𝜇 𝑖 (𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑔−𝑖 ) are his preferences over a private good 𝑥 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑖 =
(𝑔𝑖 + 𝑘 −𝑖 𝑔−𝑖 ) is the overall consumption of local public goods provided by district 𝑖, 𝑔𝑖 , and by district −𝑖,
𝑔−𝑖 , and 𝑡 𝑖 is a head tax on residents of district 𝑖
The parameter 𝑘 −𝑖 ∈ [0, 1)∀ − 𝑖, 𝑖, measures the extent of inter-regional spillovers of 𝑔−𝑖 over residents
of district 𝑖. For local public goods without spillovers 𝑘 −𝑖 = 0 ∀ − 𝑖, 𝑖, and 𝑘 −𝑖 = 1 when local spending in
district −𝑖 is over a nationwide pure public good. Condition (a) is the individual’s budget constraint. The
distribution of heterogeneous endowments across districts is given by 𝑒 𝑖 ∈ [𝑒 𝑖 , 𝑒̅ 𝑖 ]: ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) > 0 ∀𝑖 with
∑∀𝑖,−𝑖 ∫∀𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 )𝑑𝑒 𝑖 = 1. Condition (b), 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑁𝑡 𝑖 ∀𝑖, is the constraint that public goods are fully financed by
taxes.9
The nationwide welfare for this economy is given by:
𝑁𝑆𝑊 = ∑ ∫ ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝜐 𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑖 )𝑑𝑒 𝑖
∀ 𝑖,−𝑖

(1)

∀ 𝑒𝑖

The government´s budget constraints say that 𝑔𝑖 is financed by a head tax applied only to residents of the district. This configuration
allows us to eliminate any possible gains of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods by the central government over
sub-national governments. We impose this condition to evaluate whether the Decentralization Theorem of Oates (1972) holds in
modern democracies once we introduce political institutions and incentives instead of governments controlled by benevolent social
planners.
9
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Let 𝐠̂ ∗ ∈ ℝ2 : 𝐠̂ ∗ = [𝑔̂∗𝑖 , 𝑔̂∗,−𝑖 ] such that 𝐠̂ ∗ ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑁𝑆𝑊. We assume 𝐇(𝑁𝑆𝑊) is a negative
definite Hessian of 𝑁𝑆𝑊. For 𝜕𝑁𝑆𝑊 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑔̂∗𝑖 > 0, ∀𝑖, then 𝐠̂ ∗ is a global maximizer of 𝑁𝑆𝑊 in the
constrained policy set.
Proposition 1 characterizes a set of local public goods with and without spillovers that are Pareto
efficient and exhaust the gains attributed to matching the size of local public spending to the heterogeneous
most preferred individual levels across districts.

̂ ∗ = [𝑔̂∗𝑖 , 𝑔̂∗,−𝑖 ] that match the heterogeneous
Proposition 1. The Pareto efficient local public goods 𝒈
preferences of individuals across districts satisfy:
∫ ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 )
∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
𝜕𝜇 −𝑖 −𝑖
1
𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
𝑖
−𝑖 −𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑑𝑒
+
𝑘
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
=
{
}
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
𝜕𝐺 𝑖
𝜕𝐺 −𝑖
𝑁
𝜕𝑥 𝑖
∀ 𝑒 −𝑖

(2)

∀ 𝑒𝑖

Proof.
Find ∂δ𝑁𝑆𝑊 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑔̂∗𝑖 > 0, ∀𝑖 and re-arrange terms to obtain the result in (2).

In (2) local public goods with and without spillovers are provided at the point in which the marginal
social gains in both districts from a marginal change in 𝑔̂∗𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖 (equivalent to the change in utility of
𝜕𝜇 𝑖

residents of district 𝑖, ∫∀ 𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝜕𝐺𝑖 𝑑𝑒 𝑖 , and due to inter-regional spillovers the change in utility of residents of
𝜕𝜇 −𝑖

1

𝜕𝜇 𝑖

district – 𝑖, 𝑘 𝑖 ∫∀ 𝑒 −𝑖 ℎ−𝑖 (𝑒 −𝑖 ) 𝜕𝐺 −𝑖 𝑑𝑒 −𝑖 ) is equal to the social marginal costs, {𝑁} ∫∀ 𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝜕𝑥 𝑖 𝑑𝑒 𝑖 , of
financing local spending through taxation. At 𝑔̂∗𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖 the aggregate surplus from local public goods is
maximized. The heterogeneity of endowments of individuals across districts implies that 𝑔̂∗𝑖 ≠ 𝑔̂∗,−𝑖 .

4.2

Party Centralization in a Democratically Centralized Government
Now we expand the framework to incorporate electoral competition in the presence of party

centralization. Although there is a large and growing literature of political economy and fiscal federalism (for a
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survey see Lockwood 2008), the theoretical analysis of the effect of party (de)centralization in the provision of
local public goods has not been studied adequately. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study this
issue formally. In the section that follows we introduce a model of electoral competition and party centralization
with democratic centralization. Then we provide a model of electoral competition and party centralization in
which local public goods are supplied by a system of local governments. Then we develop a comparative
analysis of these equilibriums.
In our economy, the parties’ problem is to aggregate the heterogeneous and conflicting preferences of
voters for public spending into a policy platform that maximizes the parties’ probabilities of winning the
election. In the first stage, candidates announce policies and party leaders nominate the candidate that will run
in the general election with the party label. We do not model the decision of citizens to become candidates; we
simply assume two candidates in each party look for the nomination of their parties. For an economy with party
centralization, party leaders have full command over policy making by nominating only those candidates who
adopt the “ideal” fiscal policy of party leaders. In the second stage of the political process, voters observe the
parties’ announced policies and elect a public official in the general election. All individuals vote.
Two parties, labeled 𝑧 and −𝑧, compete in the election to form the government in a majoritarian
electoral system with single member districts. The winning candidate takes all, forms the government, and
implements policy. Under a central government, local public goods are provided by a single government that
represents voters of all districts. The government finances its expenditures through a uniform tax on residents of
all districts. As discussed above, we follow the literature by assuming that local public goods provided by the
central government are uniform across districts (see Oates 1972, 1995).
During the second stage of the electoral process, individuals vote for the party that advances the
spending policy that is closest to their own preferences on public spending. Denote Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 = 𝜐 𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑧𝑖 ) −
𝜐 −𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 −𝑧𝑖 ) where Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 is the difference in the voter’s payoff if party 𝑧 is elected and implements policies 𝑔 𝑧𝑖
and 𝑔 𝑧,−𝑖 in districts 𝑖 and −𝑖 instead of the alternative policies 𝑔−𝑧𝑖 and 𝑔−𝑧,−𝑖 when party – 𝑧 is elected. The
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voter type 𝑒 𝑖 votes for party 𝑧 if Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 > 0; if Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 < 0 he votes for party – 𝑧, and the voter flips a fair coin if
Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 = 0.
From the point of view of parties, the individual’s vote is uncertain (voting is probabilistic). The
Ψ𝑧𝑖

probability that a voter type 𝑒 𝑖 votes for party 𝑧 in district 𝑖 is 𝐹𝑐𝑧𝑖 (Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 ) = ∫−∞𝑐 𝑓𝑐𝑧𝑖 (Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 ) 𝑑Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 , where 𝑓𝑐𝑧𝑖 (Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 )
is a continuous probability distribution over Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 . The expected vote of party 𝑧 in district 𝑖 is 𝜙𝑐𝑧𝑖 =
∫∀ 𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝐹𝑐𝑧𝑖 (Ψ𝑐𝑧𝑖 )𝑑𝑒 𝑖 and the expected vote in both districts is 𝜙𝑐𝑧 = ∑∀𝑖,−𝑖 𝜙𝑐𝑧𝑖 . Define 𝜋𝑐𝑧 ∶ 𝜌𝑐𝑧 = 𝜙𝑐𝑧 −
𝜙𝑐−𝑧 → [0,1] as a continuous cumulative distribution over the plurality of the party, 𝜌𝑐𝑧 , where 𝜋𝑐𝑧 =
𝜌𝑧

𝑐
∫−∞ 𝑤𝑐𝑧 (𝜌𝑐𝑧 ) 𝑑𝜌𝑐𝑧 and 𝑤𝑐𝑧 (𝜌𝑐𝑧 ) is the probability distribution over the party´s plurality.

The equilibrium provision of local public goods for a democracy with a majoritarian electoral system,
party centralization, and a nationwide election to form the central government, 𝑔𝑐∗𝑧 , is characterized in
proposition 2. Under our assumptions, Downsian parties converge in their fiscal platforms since they maximize
a continuous and strictly concave probability of winning the election in the constrained policy set based on a
common system of beliefs and strategy policy set.10 Formally,

Proposition 2 Parties 𝑧 select 𝑔𝑐∗𝑧 ∀𝑧, −𝑧 for an economy with party centralization and a democratically
centralized government such that
𝑔𝑐∗𝑧 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑐𝑧 (𝜌𝑐𝑧 )
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑐𝑧𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐𝑧,−𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐𝑧 ∀ 𝑧

(3)

Define 𝐠 𝐳𝐜 = [𝑔𝑐𝑧𝑖 , 𝑔𝑐𝑧,−𝑖 ], 𝜉𝑐𝑧 and 𝛿𝑐𝑧 (𝐠 𝐳𝐜 , 𝜉𝑐𝑧 ) = 𝜋𝑐𝑧 + 𝜉𝑐𝑧 {𝑔𝑐𝑧𝑖 − 𝑔𝑐𝑧,−𝑖 }. Moreover, we assume 𝐇(𝛿𝑐𝑧 ) is a
∗𝑧
𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧
negative definite Hessian of 𝛿𝑐𝑧 . For the case 𝐠 ∗𝐳
𝐜 , 𝜉𝑐 satisfies ∂δ𝑐 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑐 = 0 ∀𝑔𝑐 > 0 and ∂δ𝑐 ⁄𝜕𝜉𝑐 =
𝑧
0 ∀ 𝜉𝑐∗𝑧 ≠ 0 then 𝐠 ∗𝐳
𝐜 is a global maximizer of 𝜋𝑐 in the constrained policy set.

10

For a formal proof of convergence in probabilistic voting models with homogeneous parties see Coughlin (1992).
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Lemma 1 Local public goods are Pareto efficient for an economy with a majoritarian electoral system, single
member districts, a democratically centralized government, a centralized party system, and for 𝑘 −𝑖 ∈ [0, 1)∀ −
𝑖, 𝑖. All parties converge in providing a uniform local public good across districts, 𝑔𝑐∗𝑧𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐∗𝑧,−𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐∗ ∀ 𝑧
satisfying
∑ (1 + 𝑘 −𝑖 ) ∫ ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 )
∀ 𝑖,−𝑖

∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
1
𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
𝑖 𝑖
𝑑𝑒
=
{
}
∑
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒 = 0
𝜕𝐺 𝑖
𝑁
𝜕𝑥 𝑖

(4)

∀𝑖,− 𝑖 ∀ 𝑒 𝑖

Proof
See the appendix.

Lemma 1 says 𝑔𝑐∗ is Pareto efficient for all 𝑘 −𝑖 ∈ [0, 1) ∀ − 𝑖, 𝑖 since a nationwide election provides
voting rights to residents of all districts and parties have electoral incentives to aggregate the individuals’
benefits (the left hand side of 4) and the costs (the right hand side of 4) from the provision of the uniform local
public good in all districts.

4.3

Party Centralization and Local Governments
We now consider the case where there is still party centralization but local public goods are provided by

a system of local governments. Two parties compete in the local election of each district to form the local
government. In a federation with a centralized party system, the leaders of nationwide parties face multiple
electoral contests and nominate candidates who propose policies that maximize the party’s joint probability of
winning the elections in districts 𝑖 and – 𝑖. As mentioned above, in a centralized party system, party leaders have
full command on policy making by nominating only those candidates who adopt the ideal fiscal policy of party
leaders. The winning party in each district takes all, forms the government, and designs policy. Local public
goods in each district are chosen by the government of the district and expenditure is financed by a uniform tax
on residents of the district.
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Anticipating the results below, this section has two main findings. First, we show that party
centralization in a system of local governments leads to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without
inter-regional spillovers. Moreover, in a system of local governments public spending is differentiated to match
the heterogeneous tax and spending policies demanded by voters across districts. Second, we show that the
provision of local public goods by a system of local governments is welfare superior to the uniform provision of
local public goods with and without spillovers if parties are centralized, party leaders seek to maximize votes,
the spending policies demanded by voters across districts are heterogeneous, and the centralized provision does
not lead to economies of scale.
We define the joint probability of party

𝑧
z winning the elections in districts 𝑖 and – 𝑖 by 𝜋𝑐𝐿
=

𝑧,−𝑖
𝑧,−𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧
𝜋𝑐𝐿
(𝜌𝑐𝐿
, 𝜌𝑐𝐿
) as a function of the pluralities of the party in both districts, 𝜌𝑐𝐿
and 𝜌𝑐𝐿
, where 𝜌𝑐𝐿
= 𝜙𝑐𝐿
−
−𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝜙𝑐𝐿
∀𝑧, ∀𝑖, and 𝜙𝑐𝐿
= ∫∀ 𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝐹𝑐𝐿
(Ψ𝑐𝐿
)𝑑𝑒 𝑖 is the proportion of votes that party 𝑧 expects to receive in the
𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
local election of district 𝑖, and 𝐹𝑐𝐿
(Ψ𝑐𝐿
) is the marginal probability that a voter type 𝑒 𝑖 votes for the party in the

district’s election.

Proposition 3 In the local election of district 𝑖 of an economy with party centralization, parties 𝑧 and −𝑧 select
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑔𝑐𝐿
∀ 𝑖 such that
𝑧,−𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧
𝑔𝑐𝐿
∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑐𝐿
(𝜌𝑐𝐿
, 𝜌𝑐𝐿
)

(5)

𝑧,−𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑧 )
𝑧
Define 𝐠 𝐳𝐜𝐋 = [𝑔𝑐𝐿
, 𝑔𝑐𝐿
], and assume 𝐇(𝜋𝑐𝐿
is a negative definite Hessian of 𝜋𝑐𝐿
. For 𝐠 ∗𝐳
𝐜𝐋 satisfying
∗𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧 ⁄
𝑧
𝜕𝜋𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑔𝑐𝐿
= 0 ∀𝑔𝑐𝐿
> 0, ∀𝑖 𝐠 ∗𝐳
𝐜𝐋 is a global maximizer of 𝜋𝑐𝐿 in the constrained policy set.

On what follows, Lemma 2 characterizes the equilibrium spending policies for this economy and
Theorem 1 shows the main result of this section.
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Lemma 2 Party centralization in a system of local governments leads to a set of Pareto efficient local public
∗𝑖
∗−𝑖
goods 𝐠 ∗𝐜𝐋 = [𝑔𝑐𝐿
, 𝑔𝑐𝐿
] for local public goods with and without spillovers. At the political equilibrium,
∗𝑖
𝑔𝑐𝐿
∀𝑖, ∀𝑧 satisfies the following:

∫ ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 )
∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
𝜕𝜇 −𝑖 −𝑖
1
𝜕𝜇 𝑖 𝑖
−𝑖
−𝑖 −𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑑𝑒
+
𝑘
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
=
{
}
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
𝜕𝐺 𝑖
𝜕𝐺 −𝑖
𝑁
𝜕𝑥 𝑖
∀ 𝑒 −𝑖

(6)

∀ 𝑒𝑖

Proof
See the appendix.

Lemma 2 says that in each district 𝑖 parties choose a policy that is equivalent to a policy that maximizes
an anonymous Utilitarian nationwide social welfare function subject to the constraint that the local public good
of the district is financed by the residents of the district.11 As a result, the spending policies in a system of local
governments are Pareto efficient for local public goods with and without spillovers. Even though a local
election in district 𝑖 does not provide voting rights to voters of other jurisdictions, local public goods are Pareto
efficient because the political process is centralized and rational parties recognize that the inter-regional
externalities of local public goods create an interdependence between the parties’ share of vote in the local
elections of districts 𝑖 and – 𝑖. Thus, parties have electoral incentives to propose spending policies that
internalize the inter-regional spillovers to maximize the party’s joint probability of winning local elections in
districts 𝑖 and – 𝑖.

Theorem 1 “Strong Decentralization Theorem”: The provision of local public goods with and without interregional spillovers by a system of local governments welfare-dominates their centralized provision when party
systems are centralized.
Proof

11

∗𝑖
See the equivalence between the results in expressions 2 and 6 implying 𝑔𝑐𝐿
= 𝑔̂∗𝑖 ∀𝑖.
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See the appendix.

Theorem 1 says that with and without inter-regional spillovers, the nationwide welfare of voters is
higher when local public goods are provided by a system of local governments than when these local public
goods are provided by the central government. This is a stronger version of the decentralization theorem in
Oates (1972), where the decentralized provision by a system of local governments is welfare superior to the
centralized provision only when local public goods do not display inter-regional spillovers.
Note, first, that the provision of local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers is Pareto
efficient under both a central government and a system of local governments. Second, party centralization and
local elections induce parties to select the size of public spending that maximizes a unanimous utilitarian
nationwide social welfare without imposing the constraint that local public goods must be uniformly provided,
as it is the case of the centralized provision. By matching the individuals’ demand for heterogeneous policies for
public spending across jurisdictions, the Pareto efficient provision of local public goods with and without
regional spillovers in a federation exhausts the nationwide welfare benefits to be gained from the matching of
local public goods to local preferences. Since the central government does not differentiate local public goods to
match local preferences, a system of local governments is welfare superior to the uniform provision.
An important assumption in our analysis is that the central government is constrained to provide uniform
local public goods. This assumption is justified because our analysis seeks to identify political institutions that
create incentive environments in which the decentralization theorem may hold or fail. Hence, it seems natural to
consider the conditions originally identified by Oates (1972) as our benchmark model. Moreover, our
assumption that the central government provides uniform public goods is quite standard in the literature, and it
has been the foundation of much of the literature on fiscal federalism. In particular, it is now agreed that central
governments may provide heterogeneous services but that the central government may also have less
information and therefore that the process may be more costly (Cremer and Palfrey 1996). Moreover, although
federations may lead to horizontal fiscal externalities (Wilson 1999) and citizens could benefit from a
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coordinated central policy, this could also lead to less accountability and efficiency (Seabright 1996). Related to
this same issue, Tomassi and Weinschelbaum (2003) characterize a tradeoff between externalities and
accountability in which decentralization might be preferred even if preferences are identical. In summary,
assuming that the central government provides uniform public goods could be interpreted as just convenient
shorthand for assuming that decentralized governments can be more efficient in matching local preferences and
needs than the central government.
However, it is relevant to consider how sensitive our results are to removing the uniformity assumption.
First, we argue that it is likely that a system of local governments is still welfare superior to the centralized
provision because the decentralized provision is Pareto efficient with and without spillovers and the central
government has political incentives to equalize the marginal political benefits and costs of allocating $1 across
jurisdictions while the system of local governments does not operate under these constraints. As a result, the
degree of differentiation by the central government might not exhaust the gains from matching the preferences
of voters across districts. On the other hand, the decentralized provision of local public goods maximizes these
gains.
Second, Kochi and Ponce (2011) characterize conditions in which the centralized provision of local
public goods would be uniform even though differentiation is feasible. They show that the heterogeneity of the
voters’ preferences across districts does not have a monotone effect on the centralized provision of local public
goods. If the heterogeneity of preferences is moderate (or spillovers are moderate) then the central government
has political incentives to provide differentiated local public goods. However, if the heterogeneity of
preferences is high or spillovers are large then the central government has electoral incentives to satisfy the
demand for local public spending from the high demand district. Because of spillovers, or significant interregional heterogeneity, the supply of the local public good in the high demand district drives the marginal
electoral benefit of producing a local public good in the low demand district to zero. As a result, the central
government offers a local public good only in the high demand district and the provision of local public goods
is uniform across districts. Therefore, there are conditions in which the decentralized provision is still welfare
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superior to the centralized one even though a differentiated centralized provision is feasible. Hence our
assumption also could be considered as a simplification of the conditions identified by Kochi and Ponce (2011).

4.4

Party Decentralization and Democratic Decentralization
We now turn our analysis to the provision of local public goods for a democracy with a majoritarian

electoral system, single member districts, and decentralized party systems. For the case of party
decentralization, a primary election takes place in which residents first vote to nominate a candidate while later
in the general election voters elect a public official. In this setting, our interest is to analyze how the political
institution of primaries creates incentives for parties to represent the interests of a broad set of voters in the
electorate versus the preferences of a minority coalition of voters in the provision of local public goods. In the
latter case, the government seeks to target the benefits of the collective action to a particular group.
Proponents of decentralized parties argue that primary elections promote the political participation of
voters and the representation of their interests in the policies eventually implemented by the government.
However, the participation rules of primaries might actually limit both the voters’ participation in elections and
their effective political influence on policy design.
Primary elections can be open, semi-closed, and closed (see Kaufman and Gimpel 2003). In open
primaries voters of any affiliation may vote for any party while in closed primaries only those voters affiliated
with a party (probably partisan voters) can vote in the party’s primary. In closed primaries candidates have
electoral incentives to weigh (discount) heavily the preferences over policy of those voters who can (not)
participate in the primary election. Hence, parties might have electoral incentives to implement the ideal
provision of local public goods of primary voters. This might be considered socially undesirable because in this
case public spending does not maximize the net fiscal exchange associated with the provision of local public
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goods for all residents but it maximizes the net fiscal surplus from public goods for a minority coalition of
voters in the electorate (the primary voters).12
The main results of this section are: first, the strong decentralization theorem does not hold for
economies with decentralized party systems. We also find that the specific institutions of primaries might (not)
lead to the expected benefits of democratic decentralization. In particular, the conventional decentralization
theorem (which assumes no spillovers) holds for economies with majoritarian electoral systems, single member
districts, and decentralized party regimes with open primaries. However, if the primaries are closed, the
decentralization theorem, in general, does not hold. In summary, our theory shows that the political institutions
of party decentralized systems may also matter considerably in how efficient democratic decentralization
outcomes actually are.

4.5

Primary and General Elections with Democratically Centralized and Decentralized Governments
Consider first the case in which parties compete for a single national government in a sequential

electoral contest. In the first stage of our model, two individuals, denoted by 𝑗 and 𝑗′ in each party seek the
nomination of their party by declaring their binding policy platforms over public spending. All voters observe
the candidates’ policies but only qualified voters vote in the primary election.13 In a closed primary the right to
vote is limited only to voters affiliated with the party, and in open primaries all voters (those affiliated and not
affiliated with some party) can vote to nominate a candidate.14 The candidate who receives the majority of the
votes across all districts wins the nomination of her party.

12

The net fiscal surplus of local public goods reflects the following tradeoff: on the one hand, an increase of public spending leads to
higher utility of voters (this is the marginal benefit). On the other hand, higher spending requires higher taxes and lower consumption
of private goods (this is the marginal cost). At low taxes, public spending is also low which implies that the marginal benefit is likely to
outweigh the marginal costs of increasing the provision of local public goods. This guarantees that at the equilibrium, the fiscal exchange
associated with the provision of local public goods entails a non-negative surplus. See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez (1982).
13
The assumption that, in the first stage of the electoral contest, candidates announce a binding policy platform is for simplicity of the
analysis and it ignores dynamic inconsistency issues such as the possibility that candidates might announce different policies in the
primary and general election to please, respectively, primary and general election voters.
14
This assumption implies that if the primary is open then all voters in the economy vote in the primaries of parties 𝑧 and – 𝑧, while if
the primary is closed then only qualified voters vote in the primary of party 𝑧 or party – 𝑧.
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In the second stage, the general election takes place and all voters in the electorate vote from the set of
nominated candidates to elect a public official. Voting is sincere at the different stages of the electoral contest.15
The winner of the general election takes all, forms the government, and implements her policy platform. In the
first stage of the game, candidates 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ 𝑧 announce their fiscal platforms on public spending to maximize the
𝑗𝑧

joint probability, Π𝑑 , of winning the nationwide primary and general elections. Candidates propose a policy
platform that is sequentially rational and therefore their policy platform must consider two different states that
might be played in the second stage: the candidates might compete in the general election against candidate 1 or
2 of party −𝑧.
𝑗𝑧

̃
𝜌

𝑗𝑧

𝜌

𝑗𝑧

𝜌

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

0
1
2
Define Π𝑑 = ∫−∞
𝑤𝑑 (𝜌̃0 , 𝜌1 , 𝜌2 ) 𝑑𝜌̃0 𝑑𝜌1 𝑑𝜌2 , as the joint cumulative mass that
∫−∞
∫−∞

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 wins both elections where 𝑤𝑑 = 𝜕Π𝑑 ⁄𝜕𝜌̃0 𝜕𝜌1 𝜕𝜌2 > 0, and 𝜌̃0 is the nationwide plurality of
𝑗𝑧

candidate 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 versus that of candidate 𝑗′ ≠ 𝑗: 𝑗′ ∈ 𝑧 in the primary election, and 𝜌1 is the nationwide
plurality for the state in which candidate 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 runs against candidate 1 ∈ −𝑧 in the general election. A similar
𝑗𝑧

interpretation is given to 𝜌2 .16
′

𝑗𝑧
𝑗𝑧
𝑗 𝑧
𝑗𝑧
For each of the pluralities in the primary 𝜌̃0 = 𝜙̃0 − 𝜙̃0 and in the general election and 𝜌𝑙 =
𝑗𝑧

𝑗,−𝑧

𝜙𝑙 − 𝜙𝑙

𝑗𝑧
𝑗′𝑧
𝑗𝑧
𝑗,−𝑧
𝑗𝑧
𝑗𝑧𝑖
∀ 𝑙 = {1,2} it is satisfied that 𝜙̃0 + 𝜙̃0 = 1 and 𝜙𝑙 + 𝜙𝑙
= 1 ∀𝑙, where 𝜙̃0 = ∑∀𝑖 𝜙̃0
𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧𝑖

is the nationwide expected proportion of the vote in the primary and 𝜙𝑙 = ∑∀𝑖 𝜙𝑙

is the nationwide expected

proportion of the vote of candidate 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 for 𝑙 = {1,2} in the general election. The expected proportion of the
𝑗𝑧𝑖
𝑗𝑧𝑖 ̃ 𝑗𝑧𝑖
𝑖
̃ 𝑗𝑧𝑖 ̃ 𝑗𝑧𝑖
vote of candidate 𝑗 in the primary of district 𝑖 is 𝜙̃0 = ∫∀ 𝑒̃ 𝑖 ℎ̃𝑖 (𝑒̃ 𝑖 ) 𝐹̃0 (Ψ
0 )𝑑𝑒̃ where 𝐹0 (Ψ0 ) =

̃0𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ1𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ2𝑗𝑧𝑖 )⁄𝜕Ψ1𝑗𝑧𝑖 𝜕Ψ2𝑗𝑧𝑖 is the continuous marginal probability that a voter type 𝑒 𝑖 in district i
𝜕 2 𝐹 𝑗𝑧𝑖 (Ψ
̃ 0𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ1𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ2𝑗𝑧𝑖 ) is the joint probability that the voter type 𝑒 𝑖
votes for 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 in the primary, and 𝐹𝑗𝑧𝑖 = 𝐹𝑗𝑧𝑖 (Ψ

15

The assumption that voters vote sincerely also seeks to simplify the analysis and it ignores strategic voting behavior such as credible
threats of some coalition of voters who might abstain from voting for the nominated candidate in the general election if the candidate
changes the policy position he previously announced in the primary election.
16
In what follows, and for the convenience of our analysis, we will distinguish voters who participate in the primary election (from
voters who participate in the general election) with a tilde.
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votes for 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 in the primary and the general election. Similarly, the corresponding proportion of the vote for
𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 in district 𝑖 in the general election is 𝜙𝑙

= ∫∀ 𝑒 𝑖 ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝐹𝑙

𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝑗𝑧𝑖

(Ψ𝑙 )𝑑𝑒 𝑖 for 𝑙 = {1 ,2} where 𝐹𝑙

𝑗𝑧𝑖

is the

marginal cumulative mass of 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 in district 𝑖 if he faces candidates 𝑙 ∈ {1 ∨ 2} ∈ −𝑧𝑖 in the general election.
The joint probability that voter type 𝑒 𝑖 votes for 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧 in the primary and the general election
̃0𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ1𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ2𝑗𝑧𝑖 ) is continuous and non-decreasing with Ψ
̃ 0𝑗𝑧𝑖 , Ψ1𝑗𝑧𝑖 , and Ψ2𝑗𝑧𝑖 . Sincere voting implies that a
𝐹𝑗𝑧𝑖 (Ψ
̃0𝑗𝑧𝑖 =
voter type 𝑒 𝑖 in district i votes for 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧𝑖 in the nationwide primary and general election if Ψ
𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝜐̃ 𝑗𝑧𝑖 (𝑒̃ 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑗𝑧𝑖 ) − 𝜐̃ 𝑗′ 𝑧𝑖 (𝑒̃ 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑗′𝑧𝑖 ) > 0, Ψ1

𝑗𝑧𝑖

= 𝜐 𝑗𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑗𝑧𝑖 ) − 𝜐1,−𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 1,−𝑧𝑖 ) > 0, Ψ2

= 𝜐 𝑗𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 𝑗𝑧𝑖 ) −

𝜐 2,−𝑧𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 , 𝐺 2,−𝑧𝑖 ) > 0.

∗𝑗𝑧

Proposition 4 A candidate 𝑗 of party 𝑧 selects 𝑔𝑑 for an economy with a democratically centralized
government and party decentralization such that
𝑗𝑧

∗𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑔𝑑 ∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 Π𝑑 (𝜌̃0 , 𝜌1 , 𝜌2 )
𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝑗𝑧,−𝑖

𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑑 = 𝑔𝑑
𝐣𝐳

𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝑗𝑧,−𝑖

Define 𝐠 𝐝 = [𝑔𝑑 𝑔𝑑

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝐣𝐳

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

(7)

= 𝑔𝑑 ∀𝑗 , ∀𝑧
𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧𝑖

𝑗𝑧,−𝑖

], 𝜉𝑑 and 𝛿𝑑 (𝐠 𝐝 , 𝜉𝑑 ) = Π𝑑 (𝜌̃0 , 𝜌1 , 𝜌2 ) + 𝜉𝑑 { 𝑔𝑑 − 𝑔𝑑

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

∗𝐣𝐳

∗𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

}.

𝑗𝑧𝑖

Moreover, assume 𝐇(𝛿𝑑 ) is a negative definite Hessian of 𝛿𝑑 . For 𝐠 𝐝 , 𝜉𝑑 satisfying 𝜕𝛿𝑑 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑 =
∗𝑗𝑧𝑖

0 ∀𝑔𝑑

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

∗𝑗𝑧

> 0 and 𝜕𝛿𝑑 ⁄𝜕𝜉𝑑 = 0 ∀𝜉𝑑

∗𝐣𝐳

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

𝑗𝑧

≠ 0, then 𝐠 𝐝 is a global maximizer of Π𝑑 (𝜌̃0 , 𝜌1 , 𝜌2 ) in the

constrained policy set.

Lemma 3 For economies with a decentralized party system and a democratically centralized government
representing voters of all districts, a uniform and Pareto efficient local public good 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔−𝑖 = 𝑔𝑑∗𝑧 ∀ 𝑧 is
provided such that it satisfies the following:

∑

∀ 𝑖,−𝑖

𝛼 𝑧𝑖 ∫ ℎ𝑖 (𝑒 𝑖 ) 𝜐𝑔𝑧𝑖 (𝑔𝑑∗𝑧 )𝑑𝑒 𝑖
∀ 𝑒𝑖
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= −𝛾 𝑧 (∑

∀ 𝑖,−𝑖

∫ ℎ̃𝑖 (𝑒̃ 𝑖 )
∀ 𝑒̃ 𝑖

𝜕𝐹̃0𝑧𝑖 𝑧𝑖 ∗𝑧
𝜐̃ (𝑔𝑑 )𝑑𝑒̃ 𝑖 ) − 𝜎𝜔𝑧
𝑧𝑖 𝑔
̃
𝜕Ψ0

(8)

1

Where 𝜐𝑔𝑧𝑖 = {𝜕𝜇 𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝐺 𝑖 } − {𝑁} {𝜕𝜇 𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑥 𝑖 } ∀𝑧𝑖. Moreover, 𝛼 𝑧𝑖 ∈ (0,1):
𝛼 𝑧𝑖 = ∑
𝑙={1,2}

𝛾𝑧 =

𝜕Π𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝑖
𝜕Π𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝑖
𝑖 𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
⁄
∑
∑
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
∀𝑖,−𝑖 𝑙={1,2}

∀ 𝑒𝑖

∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝜕Π𝑑𝑧
𝜕Π𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
⁄
∑
∑
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
𝜕𝜌̃0𝑧
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
∀𝑖,−𝑖 𝑙={1,2}

(9)

(10)

∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝛾 𝑧 is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the parties´ plurality in the primary and the
general election, and
𝜎𝜔𝑧

𝜕Π𝑑𝑧 𝑧𝑖 𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝜕Π𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ ∑
𝜎
(
,
)
⁄
∑
∑
∫
ℎ
(𝑒
)
𝑑𝑒
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧 𝑙 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝜕𝑔𝑑𝑧
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
∀𝑖,−𝑖 𝑙={1,2}

∀𝑖,−𝑖 𝑙={1,2}

(11)

∀ 𝑒𝑖

Where 𝜎𝑤𝑧 is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party z in the nationwide
general election, 𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 , and the change in the wellbeing of voters from an increase in the provision of the
local public good 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝑧 .
Proof
See the appendix.

Lemma 3 says that sequential elections (with a primary and a general election) induce candidates to
propose a uniform policy that reflects a compromise between the ideal policy of a nationwide weighted average
voter of the primary and the ideal policy of a nationwide weighted average voter of the general election (see
expression 8). In this Lemma, the left hand side of (8) is a weighted average of marginal indirect utility gains
(or the net fiscal exchange) due to a marginal change in the public good for voters of all districts participating in
the general election. The parameter 𝛼 𝑧𝑖 ∈ (0,1) reflects the relative political influence over candidates of
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residents of district i (the higher 𝛼 𝑧𝑖 the closer is public spending to the ideal policy of the average voter of
district 𝑖, and the lower 𝛼 𝑧𝑖 the closer is public spending to the ideal policy of the average voter of district −𝑖).
Similarly, the first term of the right hand side of (8) is the corresponding weighted marginal indirect
utility gain of primary voters. The expression 𝛾 𝑧 is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in
the parties’ plurality in the primary and the general election. This term reflects the parties’ incentives to weigh
more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of primary versus general election voters. The higher
𝛾 𝑧 , the higher is the marginal plurality gain of the party in the primary associated with a small increase in 𝑔𝑑∗𝑧
and the higher the electoral incentives for party 𝑧 to produce a policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted
average primary voter. If 𝛾 𝑧 = 0, then parties propose the ideal policy of a weighted average voter of the
general election.
Moreover, 𝜎𝑤𝑧 is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for party 𝑧 for the
individual type 𝑒 𝑖 , 𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 , and the change in the well-being of the voter from an increase in the provision
of the local public good 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝑧 . Candidates will have electoral incentives to increase the size of the uniform
local public good when the electorate is constituted by voters who simultaneously have higher than average
marginal probabilities of voting for the candidate and higher than average values of the net fiscal incidence of
local public goods (this term is 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝑧 ).
Let us now proceed to characterize the provision of local public goods in a system of local governments
with party decentralization. A detailed description of the electoral game for an economy with party
decentralization in a system of local governments is omitted for space reasons. However, the structure of the
game is easily extended from our previous discussion: local primary and general elections take place.
Candidates 𝑗, 𝑗´ in each party, and in each district, announce policy platforms that maximize the joint probability
𝑧𝑖
of the candidate, say 𝑗 ∈ 𝑧, of winning the primary and general elections in their district, 𝜋𝑑𝐿
(𝜌̃0𝑧𝑖 , 𝜌1𝑧𝑖 , 𝜌2𝑧𝑖 ).

Only qualified residents of the district vote in the local primary while all the residents of the district can vote in
the local general election. Voting is sincere in both elections. The local general election takes place, the winner
takes all, and implements his policy platform.
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Proposition 5 In the local election of district 𝑖 of an economy with party decentralization, all candidates 𝑗, 𝑗´ of
∗𝑧𝑖
party 𝑧 select 𝑔𝑑𝐿
∀𝑧 such that
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝑔𝑑𝐿
∈ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋𝑑𝐿
(𝜌̃0𝑧𝑖 , 𝜌1𝑧𝑖 , 𝜌2𝑧𝑖 )

(12)

𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝐿
We assume 𝐇( 𝜋𝑑𝐿
) is a negative definite Hessian of 𝜋𝑑𝐿
. If 𝑔𝑑𝐿
∀𝑧 satisfies 𝜋𝑑𝐿
= 0 ∀𝑔𝑑𝐿
>
∗𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
0, ∀𝑧 then 𝑔𝑑𝐿
is a global maximizer of 𝜋𝑑𝐿
in the constrained policy set.

On what follows, Lemma 4 provides a general characterization of local public goods for an economy
with majoritarian rule, single member districts, party decentralized regimes and a system of local governments.
Also, Theorems 2 and 3 show that the strong decentralization theorem (which is robust to inter-jurisdictional
spillovers) is not satisfied for economies with decentralized party systems and that the conventional
decentralization theorem holds in the case of open primaries and fails to hold in the case of closed primaries.

Lemma 4 For economies with party decentralization and a system of local governments representing voters in
∗𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
each district, local public goods 𝑔𝑑𝐿
∀ 𝑖, −𝑖 are provided such that 𝑔𝑑𝐿
satisfies the following:

𝑖

∫ ℎ (𝑒

𝑖

∗𝑧𝑖
) 𝜐𝑔𝑧𝑖𝑑𝐿 (𝑔𝑑𝐿
)𝑑𝑒 𝑖

= −𝜒

𝑧𝑖

∀ 𝑒𝑖

( ∫ ℎ̃𝑖 (𝑒̃ 𝑖 )
∀ 𝑒̃ 𝑖

𝜕𝐹̃0𝑧𝑖 𝑧𝑖
∗𝑧𝑖
𝜐̃ (𝑔𝑑𝐿
)𝑑𝑒̃ 𝑖 ) − 𝜎𝜔𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖 𝑔𝑑𝐿
̃
𝜕Ψ0

(13)

Where

𝜒

𝑧𝑖

=

𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑑𝐿

𝜕𝜌̃0𝑧𝑖

⁄ ∑
𝑙={1,2}

𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑑𝐿

𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

∫ ℎ (𝑒 )
∀ 𝑒𝑖

𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖

𝑑𝑒 𝑖

(14)

Where 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 is a weighted rate of substitution between marginal changes in the party’s plurality in the district’s
primary and the general local election, and
𝜎𝜔𝑧𝑖

=

𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑑𝐿

∑
𝜎𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝜌𝑙
𝑙={1,2}

𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝜕𝜋𝑑𝐿
𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 𝑖
𝑖 𝑖
( 𝑧𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖 )⁄ ∑
∫ ℎ (𝑒 )
𝑑𝑒
𝜕Ψ𝑙 𝜕𝑔𝑑𝐿
𝜕𝜌𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖
𝑙={1,2}

(15)

∀ 𝑒𝑖
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Where 𝜎𝜔𝑧𝑖 is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability that voter type 𝑒 𝑖 votes for party z in the
local general election in district i, 𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 , and the change in the well being of voters from an increase in
𝑧𝑖
the provision of the local public good 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝐿
.

Proof
See the appendix.

The interpretation of this equilibrium is similar to that given in Lemma 3. In local elections, parties
provide a public good that reflects a compromise between the ideal spending policies of the district’s weighted
average voter in the primary election and the district’s weighted average voter in the general election (this is
condition 13).The parties’ incentives to weigh more (less) heavily the preferences over public spending of
primary versus general election voters in district 𝑖 are given by 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 . The higher 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 , the higher the electoral
incentives for party 𝑧 to produce a policy closer to the ideal policy of the weighted average voter of the primary
in district 𝑖. If 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖, then parties propose the ideal policy of the weighted average voter of the general
election in each district.
In open primaries, local public goods are Pareto efficient for all values of 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 (because in our model the
distribution of voters participating in the primary election is exactly the same as the distribution of voters
participating in the general election). However, for closed primaries, local public goods are Pareto efficient
except for the case in which 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 is high enough because, in this case, local public goods maximize the wellbeing of local primary voters (a local minoritarian coalition in the district).
Moreover, the expression, 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 , is a weighted covariance between the marginal probability of voting for
party 𝑧 in the general election of the district, 𝜕𝐹𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 , and the change in well being of voters from an
𝑧𝑖
increase in the provision of the local public good, 𝜕Ψ𝑙𝑧𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑔𝑑𝐿
. For 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 > 0; the higher 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 the higher the

provision of the public good in the district.17

The parameter 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 determines whether government spending is high (low) at the political equilibrium. Example, the combination of
𝜒 = 0 ∧ 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖, ∀𝑧 implies that local governments produce local public goods that maximize a utilitarian social welfare of all
17

𝑧𝑖
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Theorem 2 In majoritarian democracies with a decentralized party system, open primaries, and single member
districts, the strong decentralization theorem does not hold but the conventional decentralization theorem
holds.
Proof
See the appendix

On the one hand, Theorem 2 shows that candidates running for local governments in a party
decentralized system with open primaries have incentives to propose the size of public spending that maximizes
a unanimous Utilitarian social welfare function of local residents in each jurisdiction. In other words, under
local elections with open primaries, parties propose the ideal policy of the average voter of the district and
therefore the resulting policies are Pareto efficient but only for local public goods without spillovers. Therefore
the strong decentralization theorem does not hold for economies with party decentralized systems and open
primaries. Moreover, the local provision of public goods matches the heterogeneous preferences of voters
across districts.
On the other hand, if the government is democratically centralized and there is party decentralization
with open primaries the provision of local public goods with and without spillovers is uniform and Pareto
efficient. In this case, the size of the local public good reflects the ideal size on public spending from the
average voter of all districts. 18 Lastly, Theorem 2 shows that if local public goods do not display regional
∗𝑖
spillovers then a system of local governments supplying local public goods 𝑔𝑑𝐿
> 0 in districts 𝑖 and −𝑖 is

welfare superior to a uniform provision, 𝑔𝑑∗ > 0, by a centralized government, because the heterogeneous

residents in the district (which is explained by 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖, ∀𝑧 ) and the size of the local public good is high at the equilibrium which is
explained by a high value of 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖, ∀𝑧 . If 𝜎𝑤𝑧𝑖 < 0 ∀𝑖, ∀𝑧, the size of the local public good is too low at the equilibrium.
18
In open primaries the distribution of ideal policies of primary and general election voters is the same. For this reason, candidates in
local elections have strong incentives to select the ideal policy of the average voter of the district (which means that local public goods
without spillovers are Pareto efficient) while candidates competing in a nationwide election have also strong incentives to choose the
ideal policy of the average voter of all districts (which means that local public goods with and without spillovers are efficient).
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provision of local public goods by a democratically decentralized system will maximize the welfare gains of
policy differentiation. Consequently, the conventional decentralization theorem holds for majoritarian
democracies with decentralized party regimes and open primaries.

Theorem 3 The strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold in majoritarian democracies
with single member districts and decentralized party systems with closed primaries.
Proof
See the appendix

In general, the strong and the conventional decentralization theorems do not hold for a democracy with
party decentralization and closed primaries.19 As we mentioned before, sequential elections (with a primary and
a general elections) induce candidates to propose a policy that reflects a compromise between the ideal policy of
a weighted average voter of the primary and the ideal policy of a weighted average voter of the general election
(see expression 8). In the case of closed primaries, it is likely that minority coalitions (i.e. primary voters) could
have strong political influence over local governments that is translated into policies on local public goods that
are closer to their preferences. In this case, electoral competition might produce extreme policy positions (too
much or too little local public spending) instead of the policy that maximizes the surplus from the net fiscal
exchange for the society as a whole.
For instance, in condition (13) there are parametric values of 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 in which local elections produce the
size of public spending in the vicinity of the ideal policy of primary voters in each district (a minority of the
society) instead of the ideal policy of all residents in each district (the utilitarian measure of social welfare). 20

19

A comparison of (8) and (2) shows that the electorally optimal policy for Downsian candidates in a nationwide sequential election
with closed primaries is, in general, different from the size of public spending that maximizes the fiscal surplus from public spending
for all residents in the economy. A similar conclusion is reached for local elections in a federation (see conditions 13 and 2). As a
result, the strong decentralization theorem does not hold. In the appendix we also show that, in general, the conventional
decentralization theorem does not hold for economies with party decentralization and closed primaries.
20
In particular, significantly large values of 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 ∀𝑖 imply that the marginal change of the joint probability of winning the primary and
the general election due to a marginal gain from the plurality of the primary is sufficiently high (maybe because the candidate who
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Simultaneously, we can find parametric values in the equilibrium in which there is a centralized government
that averages the political influence of local coalitions to produce a more moderate provision of local public
goods that could be welfare superior to the less moderate provision of public goods in the system of local
governments (i.e. when 𝛾 𝑧 ⟶ 0 ∧ 𝜒 𝑧𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖, ∀𝑧 and sufficiently high). This is likely true for an economy
with many localities in which the political influence of local coalitions is significant over local governments but
the influence of local minority groups fades away in the nationwide election. Therefore, in this setting, the
provision of a uniform public good by a centralized government could be welfare superior to the set of
differentiated but extreme policy positions produced by a system of local governments.21
In summary, we have shown in our model that political institutions may matter considerably in how
efficient fiscal decentralization outcomes actually are. We have seen that a strong version of the decentralization
theorem –in the presence of externalities– holds for a system of democratically decentralized local governments
operating within a centralized party system. In addition the strong decentralization theorem does not hold for
economies with party decentralized systems but the conventional decentralization theorem (which requires the
absence of interregional externalities) holds for a system of democratically decentralized local governments
operating within a decentralized party system with open primaries. However, the conventional decentralization
theorem does not hold for a system of democratically decentralized local governments operating within a
decentralized party system and closed primaries. In the next section we explore how those different sets of
political institutions actually affect local public goods outcomes in the real world.

5

Empirical Analysis
In this section we test the hypothesis that political institutions affect the efficiency with which local

public goods are provided. More specifically, we evaluate the key expectation stemming from our formal

wins the primary would win with almost certainty the general election) and therefore party 𝑧 will select the ideal policy of a minority
of the electorate (i.e. the ideal policy of the weighted average voter of the primary in district i).
21
It is also simple to characterize conditions in which a system of local governments would produce public goods that are Pareto
superior to those provided by a democratically centralized government.
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model that the combination of democratic decentralization and party centralization will lead to the best delivery
of local public goods, other things equal.22 To do this, we make use of a series of quantitative models of all
electorally competitive countries from 1976 to 2006, contingent on data availability. Our most expansive model
considers 2237 observations and 135 countries, to our knowledge the broadest examination of sub-national
political institutions in the literature.
We employ five different measures of educational outcomes and three different measures of health
outcomes to operationalize our dependent variable, the provision of public goods at the sub-national level.
Education and health measures are often used in the empirical literature to denote public goods provision at the
sub-national level (see, for example, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007 and Faguet and Sanchez 2008). Our
specific measures come from World Bank (2010) and include Primary School Completion Rate, Primary
School Teachers as a proportion of youth population, Children out of School as a proportion of youth
population, Primary Enrollment Rate, Primary School Ratio of Girls to Boys, Children Receiving DPT
Immunizations, Public Health Expenditures, and Infant Mortality. Note that, for robustness, these variables
include indicators of both policy input (i.e. Public Health Expenditures) and final policy outcome (i.e. Infant
Mortality). Indeed, in order to determine whether our theory operates through increased spending or increased
policy efficiency, we divide our health policy analyses into one model that considers inputs and two that
measure outputs. Consistent with the literature, these latter models make use of a policy outcome as the
dependent variable and also control for spending. We are unable to construct our education model in this way
because educational spending data are much sparser. We discuss how our eight dependent variables are coded
and provide some summary statistics in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here

22

At the sub-national level, we are unable to differentiate empirically between types of primaries and whether open list systems are
more or less decentralized. For that reason, we compare centralized and decentralized parties in the aggregate. As noted above, our
theory predicts that the strong decentralization theorem should hold for all systems with centralized parties but only for some with
decentralized parties. This finding is consistent across both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. For that reason, if our
arguments are correct, an aggregate comparison of centralized and decentralized parties should reveal some differential effects.
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We select educational and health outcomes as our dependent variables because they allow us to examine
both allocative efficiency gains (i.e. differentiation based on local preference – the main hypothesized benefit of
decentralization as reflected in the decentralization theorem) and the degree to which public goods are provided
in the face of spillovers (our hypothesized benefit of centralized parties). Why should this be so? First, our
indicators of educational and health provision are subject to strong extra-jurisdictional spillover effects. All
inhabitants of a country benefit from the educational attainment of their fellow citizens — in general, greater
knowledge accumulation leads to reduced crime and economic improvements that spill outside the limits of any
single jurisdiction. Another source of spillover effects occurs with population mobility – local residents may
move outside a jurisdiction after receiving their education, and residents of neighboring jurisdictions may
sometimes register for schools not provided in their own locales. For these reasons, the provision of education,
as measured by our indicators, can be associated with a greater willingness on the part of local leaders to
provide public goods in the presence of spillovers. The same is likely to be the case with the provision of basic
health services such as vaccination. In many countries, basic health is under the authority of sub-national
governments, and it is a common occurrence for citizens to cross jurisdictional boundaries in pursuit of care. In
addition, as with education, there are clear national spillover effects associated with a healthier population.
Our educational and health indicators also capture allocative efficiency effects for at least two reasons.
First, improved political accountability resulting from democratic decentralization provides decentralized
governments greater incentives to act in accordance with the needs and preferences of their constituents. While
most constituencies will prize superior educational outcomes, different sorts of practices are likely to produce
these outcomes in different locales. For example, in one jurisdiction, limited resources might best be channeled
into increasing the number of teachers, whereas in another improved educational materials might be the focus.
As a result, we believe that superior educational provision likely reflects (other things equal) an ability on the
part of officials to consider local preferences and conditions. In a similar way, while all citizens are likely to
favor high quality health services, scarce local resources may, for example, be more efficiently used on medical
centers in one constituency and on medicines in another. Positive health outcomes are therefore more likely to
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obtain, we believe, when local governments can target their resources to the differing needs of their
constituents.
Second, the literature also bears out our use of educational and health outcomes to measure allocative
efficiency and the internalization of spillovers. For example, two papers (Faguet and Sanchez 2005 and SoléOllé and Esteller-Moré 2005) conclude that decentralization leads to better adjustment between investment
patterns and local demands (in Bolivian municipalities in the first instance and Spanish provinces in the
second). Similarly, in a more recent paper, Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, and McNab (2012) analyze
the effects of decentralization on the composition of public expenditures for a large panel of countries and
conclude that decentralization of public goods delivery is usually accompanied by an increase in educational
expenditures. This finding asserts that decentralization, via greater responsiveness of public officials and
preference matching, can increase allocative efficiency by altering the composition of public expenditures. And
an analysis by Cerniglia and Longaretti (2013) shows that the targeting of educational services to the specific
preferences of different jurisdictions can contribute to more rapid human capital accumulation and accelerated
growth.
On the right side of the equation, our theory requires that we consider both the existence of elected subnational governments and the level of party decentralization at the sub-national level. We develop an original
dataset of sub-national political institutions to capture both of these measures, which we code for all countries
between 1975 and 2007, where data are available. As part of this dataset, we code for the presence of elections,
the structure of legislative-executive relations, the electoral system, the extent to which the national party
system is replicated, and the centralization of parties at both the highest sub-national level and the municipal
level (defined as the lowest level of sub-national government).23
To operationalize party centralization, we make use of an indicator first developed by Carey and Shugart
(1995) and labeled the “Ballot” variable. This variable measures what is perhaps the most significant power

23

Note that another comprehensive dataset of sub-national indicators has recently been produced by Ivanyna and Shah (2012), but
their focus is not on the specific political institutions that we code.
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that national party leaders can wield – the power to nominate candidates for office. The ballot variable is coded
“0” when national party leaders have full nomination powers, “1” when they nominate a list but voters have the
power to change its order (as in open list or alternate vote systems), and “2” when they have little power over
nomination (as in primary systems or systems where candidates get on the ballot by collecting signatures or
paying a fee). Carey and Shugart coded their variable for a small number of representative cases, and Hankla
(2006) later added all democracies from 1975 to 2004. We expand these datasets by capturing not just the
power of national party leaders to nominate candidates for the national legislature, but also whether these
national party leaders can nominate candidates to regional and local assemblies.
Yet, simply coding party centralization is not enough to measure the power of national party leaders
over sub-national and municipal elections. We also need to know whether national parties are competing and
winning in these elections. If only 10% of a municipal council’s seats are held by national parties, or if, for
example, 50% of its seats are chosen in non-partisan elections, national party influence cannot be significant
even if parties are centralized as defined above.
Drawing on these considerations, we create two key independent variables from our dataset to include in
the model. Our first dummy variable, labeled Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization, is coded “1”
when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2) more than 75% of municipal council seats are held by national
parties, and (3) national party leaders exercise centralized power over municipal party nomination (i.e. party
centralization is coded “0” above).24 Our second, labeled Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization,
is coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and either (2) 75% or fewer of municipal council seats are
held by national parties, or (3) national party leaders do not control party nomination in municipal elections.
Our omitted reference category, of course, is systems with no democratic decentralization at all. To our

24

Note that the extent of local party system nationalization can vary by municipality within individual countries, and that party
centralization can vary by party within individual countries. There tends, all the same, to be a great deal of commonality in party
system nationalization and party structure within a country, allowing for relatively straightforward coding in most cases. That said,
when we encountered mixed cases, we went with what appeared to be the most common institutional structure in the country. In
addition, in cases where all the available evidence pointed to national party domination of local elections, we assumed that more than
75% of seats were held by these parties, even if detailed data were not available. Those country-years coded “1” on the primary
dummy variable are listed in Table 2, and we are very open to feedback by country experts on the accuracy of the coding.
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knowledge, this article is the first to consider party system nationalization and party centralization
simultaneously in a large empirical model.
Our operationalization of municipal elections is fairly permissive, requiring only that multiparty or
competitive non-party elections are held. It is also worth noting that, although our dataset includes information
on both regional and municipal institutions, we focus on municipalities (defined as the lowest sub-national
authority) in this analysis. We believe that this level of government, in the aggregate, is most likely to matter
for the educational and health outcomes that we consider.
Beyond our key theoretical indicators, we control for potentially confounding political factors by
including three additional variables, also coded as part of our original dataset. The first of these is Municipal
Plurality, coded “1” when municipal council elections are held using a plurality (as opposed to a proportional or
mixed) electoral system. The second is Municipal Directly Elected Executive, coded “1” when municipal
executives are directly elected and not removable (except through impeachment or election recall) by the
municipal councils. While there is little research on the impact of these institutions at the municipal level,
previous research on electoral and executive institutions at the national level indicates that they may matter for
public goods outcomes.25 For example, there is reason to believe that strong unitary executives (elected and
subject to reasonable legislative oversight) may produce better public outcomes than dominant legislatures (see,
for example, Mukherjee 2003; Egger, Koethenbuerger and Smart 2010; and Sabatini 2003). And, although this
finding is still quite contested, proportional electoral systems may have certain benefits over simple plurality
systems (see, for example, Lijphart 1977). Our third political control variable is coded “1” when elections are
held at the regional, or highest sub-national, level. Elected government at this intermediate level, when it exists,
may have an independent impact on public goods delivery. For all of the political variables, of course,
democratically centralized systems are among those coded “0”.
We also include in the model a series of economic and social control variables, namely GDP per capita
in purchasing power parity, fertility rate, population density, total population, decade dummies, and, in some

25

For a summary of this literature as it relates to local political institutions, see Hankla and Downs (2010).
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cases, world region dummies. Countries with a higher GDP per capita can be expected to have more resources
to allocate for education and health. Likewise, countries with lower fertility rates will tend to have more
resources to devote to each mother and child. A higher level of population density should also be associated
with better educational and health outcomes, as it facilitates access to teachers, school resources, and medical
treatment. Finally, municipal institutions may be especially important in countries with greater populations.
The data for all of our economic and social indicators are taken from World Bank (2010).
In addition to these variables, we include dummies for each decade in all of the models to account for
temporal trends in educational and health outcomes. For the random effects models, we also include dummies
for world regions to control for cultural or geographically specific effects, something that is already accounted
for in the fixed effects and Arellano-Bond models (see below). And as our theoretical model assumes elections,
we also restrict our models to countries that are minimally electorally competitive at the national level, using the
Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
This index ranges from one to seven, and we only include country-years coded at least a six, indicating that
more than one party holds seats in the national legislature. We choose this more expansive definition of
electoral competition in preference to a measure of democracy (such as Polity) in order to maximize our
observations and because we believe that electoral competition but not necessary full-fledged democracy must
be present to observe our theorized effects. Summary statistics on all of our variables are presented in Table 1,
and a complete listing of all country-years coded “1” on our primary Democratic Decentralization, Party
Centralization variable is presented in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 here
To ensure the robustness of our empirical tests, we estimate three separate models for each dependent
variable. Our primary models use a random effects framework with AR1 autocorrelation correction, decade
dummies, and world region dummies. While Hausman tests indicate that our panel effects are not fully random,
our indicators of interest vary primarily (though not exclusively) across panels, and so we have chosen random
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effects so as not to wash away our most interesting variation. Instead, we seek to control for these panel effects
with world region dummies.
In addition, our Fisher tests indicate that, at a minimum, some of the panels for each of our dependent
variables are stationary, and in any case the literature counsels against unit root corrections for short panels and
for dependent variables that cannot, by their nature, trend indefinitely (see Beck and Katz 2009). For this
reason, we make use of an AR1 correction to deal with the autocorrelation present in the model. As noted
above, we also include decade dummies to control for any potential time trends in the dependent variables.
To avoid any chance of bias arising from the assumption of random effects, we also estimate fixed
effects models as our first robustness test. These models, like those above, make use of decade dummies and an
AR1 correction. They are, of course, more robust to omitted variable bias than the random effects models, but
they also consider only the less important cross-temporal variation present in our data. Our final robustness
tests make use of the Arellano-Bond System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (see Roodman
2009). This approach allows us to address any potential reverse causality in the models by instrumenting
endogenous variables with their differences and lags.26 It also corrects for panel effects, autocorrelation, and
(with robust standard errors) heteroskadasticity. We present the results of our eight primary models in Table 3,
of our fixed effects models in Table 4, and of our Arellano-Bond models in Table 5.
Insert Tables 3, 4, and 5 here

5.1

Results
The empirical results provide strong support for our hypotheses. Taking first the primary models in

Table 3, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is statistically significant in six of the
eight estimations and in the expected direction but not significant in the other two. Given that these eight
models differ significantly in their dependent variables and in the number and identity of the observations they
include, the consistency of the results is quite striking. The Democratic Decentralization, Party

26

We identify three variables – Fertility, Logged GDP per capita, and Logged Population Density as potentially endogenous.
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Decentralization variable is statistically significant only in the Children Out of School model, where its
coefficient is much lower than the coefficient of the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization
variable.27 In all of the remaining models, the variable is in the expected direction but not statistically
significant. These results support our expectations that combining municipal elections with centralized parties
produces the best service delivery outcomes, and that combining municipal elections with decentralized parties
is still generally superior to having no democratic decentralization at all (the omitted reference category).28 And
the size of these predicted effects is also worthy of consideration. Model 1, for instance, indicates that the
combination of democratic decentralization and party centralization causes an increase in primary school
enrollment of more than two percent, or a little less than one-tenth of a standard deviation. The effect of this
institutional combination on the percentage of children out of school is even greater, reducing it by about onefifth of a standard deviation.
Moreover, the results are only slightly weaker when rerun using fixed effects and Arellano-Bond. In the
fixed effects models, shown in Table 4, the Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is
statistically significant in five of the eight estimations, and the Democratic Decentralization, Party
Decentralization in two (and nearly so in a third). It is worth noting that in two of the five models with
significant results (Children Out of School and Primary School Teachers), there is no evidence that
democratically decentralized countries with centralized parties outperform those with decentralized parties.

27

When Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization is statistically significant and Democratic Decentralization, Party
Decentralization is not, we can be confident that the combination of democratic decentralization and party centralization produces
better outcomes than the residual category of no local elections, but that we cannot be sure of the same effect when local elections
occur under decentralized parties. Such a finding is clearly supportive of our arguments, but it is distinct from a finding that the
effects of Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization and those of Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization are
statistically significantly different from one another. We tested this hypothesis for the models in Table 1 and found that the effects of
Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization were indeed significantly greater than those of Democratic Decentralization, Party
Decentralization in two models (Primary Enrollment Rate and Public Health Expenditures) and that they were nearly so (between
10% and 20% probability) in two others (Infant Mortality and Children Out of School).
28
Some readers may wonder about the impact of fiscal decentralization on our models. Might the relationships we identify only
matter when local governments have the financial power to deliver public goods? To evaluate this possibility, we estimated the
random effects models with only fiscally decentralized countries and years, defined as those observations where both revenue and
expenditure decentralization exceeded 10% of total government amounts (as reported in the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics).
Because this approach severely limited our total observations, due largely to missing data, we did not report these as our primary
models. The results are robust for most of the dependent variables, but they do become insignificant for Primary Enrollment Rate and
Public Health Expenditures, and fall to just below the 10% significance mark for Infant Mortality. These changes are likely due to the
dramatic lowering of the number of observations we are able to include in these models.
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Such evidence is, however, present in the remaining three models (Primary Completion Rate, Primary
Enrollment Rate, and Public Health Expenditures). It is likely that the slightly weaker results produced by
these models result from their focus only on cross-temporal changes in the independent variables of interest.
Finally, in the Arellano-Bond models, shown in Table 5, the Democratic Decentralization, Party
Centralization variable is statistically significant in seven of the eight estimations, and the Democratic
Decentralization, Party Decentralization in six. In all but one of these cases, the impact of the Democratic
Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is greater than that of the Democratic Decentralization, Party
Decentralization variable, as expected, although the difference is less great than in the primary models. It is
also worth noting that we find significant effects for two of the dependent variables, Primary Ratio of Girls to
Boys and DPT Immunization, which were not significant in Tables 3 and 4. Overall, the Arellano-Bond models
provide evidence for the hypothesis that local elections and centralized parties are best, but this evidence is
somewhat weaker than that found in Table 3. These models do, however, demonstrate clearly the benefits of
democratic decentralization relative to the complete absence of local elections.
Does the available evidence support a spending or an efficiency explanation for the superior
performance of party centralized, democratically decentralized systems? The presence of local elections is
clearly associated both with increased spending on health and with better immunization and infant mortality
outcomes. The evidence for the additional benefit of centralized parties is, however, clearer in the spending
models (though it also appears in the infant mortality fixed effects model). So, it seems likely that local
elections are incentivizing increased public good spending and increased efficiency of delivery, and that
centralized parties are at a minimum raising spending (though they may also have an efficiency impact).
Finally, note that there is strong evidence linking increased spending with best policy outputs in health.
Which control variables matter for educational and health outcomes? Perhaps the most interesting
finding is that municipalities with plurality electoral systems tend to provide public service delivery that is
inferior to those with proportional or multimember systems. This effect, which is consistent with previous
findings related to national-level institutions, is particularly robust with respect to the number of children out of
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school and total health expenditures, but it also shows up elsewhere. More surprisingly, there is evidence, albeit
much weaker, that systems with directly elected mayors may show inferior performance as well.
Among the economic and social control variables, perhaps the most robust finding is the strong
association between low fertility and high GDP per capita on the one hand and positive health and educational
outcomes on the other. The only major exception to this rule is the link between per capita income and inferior
outcomes that appears in several of the Arellano-Bond models. This surprising finding is likely due to this
model’s incorporation of a first differences equation; countries that are already rich may see fewer
improvements in health or education indicators.
Population density also tends to be associated with positive outcomes, although less universally than low
fertility; countries with high density levels are likely to experience greater ease of service delivery than highly
ruralized economies. The effects of total population are more mixed and tend to vary with each indicator.
Perhaps the most surprising finding among the control variables, however, relates to the regional elections
dummy. It is sometimes, though not always, associated with negative outcomes in the random and fixed effects
models, and more robustly associated with positive outcomes (as expected) in the Arellano-Bond models. This
difference indicates that the variable may be highly correlated with some of the endogenous variables in the
GMM model, and that the differential treatment of these variables affects their predicted impact. In any case,
the results here are too mixed to draw any definitive conclusions about the impact of regional elections on
public goods delivery.
What can we say to summarize the results? The strongest implication of our theoretical model –yielding
the strong decentralization theorem—is the welfare dominance of democratic decentralization with party
centralization. The benefits of combining democratic decentralization with party centralization are well borne
out in our empirical analyses. The Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization variable is statistically
significant and in the expected direction in eighteen of the twenty-four models, and it is either stronger or more
statistically significant than the Democratic Decentralization, Party Decentralization in all but three of these
eighteen. While this difference between the two variables is only sometimes statistically significant, it is highly
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consistent across a variety of indicators. Given the difficulty of measuring educational and health outcomes,
particularly in the developing world, and given the complexity and specificity of local politics in different
countries, the robustness of the results provided here is notable. With a reasonable degree of certainty, we
therefore conclude that the combination of local elections and national parties is superior for public goods
delivery (other things equal), and that the existence of decentralized locally elected government, even when
national parties are not present, is in any case superior to a fully centralized system.

6

Conclusion
In this paper, we examine which types of political institutions may be necessary to deliver the gains

from decentralization predicted by much of the literature. We begin by developing a formal extension and
refinement of the decentralization theorem of Oates (1972), which has provided the basis for much past
research. In particular, we provide a political economy analysis of the provision of local public goods by
incorporating the joint influence of democratic (de)centralization and party (de)centralization. Our theory
provides new insights to the theory of fiscal federalism: first, we show that for countries with centralized
parties, a system of elected local governments welfare-dominates a centralized structure of government even if
local public goods show inter-jurisdictional spillovers. We call this result the “strong decentralization theorem”.
Indeed, an important implication of our theoretical model is that the combination of democratic decentralization
and party centralization tends to produce the most efficient provision of public goods. Democratic
decentralization ensures that local governments are responsive to the desires of their constituents, while party
centralization incentivizes local leaders to pay for goods that may have spillover benefits.
Second, we show that, for countries with decentralized parties, the strong decentralization theorem does
not hold. In other words, we demonstrate that creating locally elected governments can only be expected to
improve public goods allocation either when parties are centralized or when there are no inter-jurisdictional
spillovers. Local governments controlled by decentralized parties are not likely to provide public goods that
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spill over into adjacent constituencies. To summarize, then, our theory points to the importance of political
institutions in determining how efficient fiscal decentralization outcomes actually are.
To test our argument empirically, we create a large dataset on sub-national political institutions and use
it to estimate a series of cross-national empirical analysis of educational and health outcomes. Our dataset is, to
our knowledge, the first to compile measures of sub-national political institutions across a large set of countries.
Our empirical findings provide strong support for our hypothesis. They show that the combination of municipal
elections and party centralization tends to produce the best educational and health outcomes.
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to understand better how the growing prevalence of decentralization,
mitigated by the structure of local political institutions, may impact the everyday lives of citizens around the
world. We find that political institutions, which are typically ignored in the economics literature on fiscal
decentralization that begins with Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, may significantly influence the
efficiency of decentralized systems. Our results also show the potential of merging political science and
economics into broader approaches to explore the inter-connected dynamics of decentralized governance.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Computation Method and Source

Mean

Range

Expectations

Primary School Completion
Rate

The ratio of total primary school graduates to the total
population of relevant age. (Source: World Bank)

81.7

10.0 to
125

Dependent Variable

Children Out of School
Primary School Teachers
Primary School Enrollment
Primary School Ratio of
Girls to Boys

The ratio of primary aged children not enrolled in school
to the total population under age 14. (Source: World Bank)
The ratio of primary school teachers to the total population
under age 14. (Source: World Bank)
The ratio of total enrollment in primary school, regardless
of age, to the total population of primary school age.
(Source: World Bank)
The ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary school.
(Source: World Bank)

0 to
29.4
.113 to
4.34

Dependent Variable

99.3

17.9 to
158

Dependent Variable

95.6

48.3 to
122

Dependent Variable

4.36
1.60

Dependent Variable

Children Receiving DPT
Immunizations

The percentage of children aged 12 to 24 months who
have received adequate DPT vaccination. (Source: World
Bank)

79.3

1 to
99

Dependent Variable

Public Health Expenditure

Total public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP
(Source: World Bank)

3.46

0 to
14.1

Dependent Variable

Infant Mortality

Number of infants dying before one year of age per 1000
live births (Source: World Bank)

38.2

2.2 to
154

Dependent Variable

Democratic
Decentralization, Party
Centralization (Lagged)

Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2)
more than 75% of municipal council seats are held by
national parties, and (3) national party leaders control
party nomination in municipal elections. (Source: Original
Dataset)

Democratic
Decentralization, Party
Decentralization (Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)
Municipal Directly Elected
Executive (Lagged)
Fertility (Lagged)
Logged GDP per capita
(Lagged)
Logged Population Density
(Lagged)
Regional Elections
(Lagged)
Logged Population
(Lagged)
Legislative Electoral
Competitiveness (Lagged)

Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and
either (2) 75% or fewer of municipal council seats are held
by national parties, or (3) national party leaders do not
control party nomination in municipal elections. (Source:
Original Dataset)
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2)
a plurality system is used to elect the municipal assembly.
(Source: Original Dataset)
Coded “1” when (1) there are municipal elections, and (2)
the municipal mayor or other executive is directly elected
and cannot be removed by the municipal council. (Source:
Original Dataset)
Lagged average births per woman
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged Logged GDP per capita ppp
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged logged people per square kilometer
(Source: World Bank)
Coded “1” when competitive elections are held at the
regional level (Source: Original Dataset)
Lagged logged total population
(Source: World Bank)
Lagged Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness
(Source: Database of Political Institutions)

Positive
(but the sign for this and
all variables below
should be reversed for
Children Out of School
and Infant Mortality)
Insignificant or Positive
with a smaller sign than
Democratic
Decentralization, Party
Centralization

.456

Dummy

.303

Dummy

.241

Dummy

Uncertain (Negative?)

.309

Dummy

Uncertain
(Positive?)

3.29
8.59
4.00

1.08 to
7.74
5.71 to
10.8
.366 to
8.76

Negative
Positive
Positive

.437

Dummy

Uncertain
(Positive?)

16.1

12.3 to
20.8

Uncertain

1 to 7

Used to restrict dataset to
countries with multiple
parties in the national
legislature (scoring 6 or
7)

N/A
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Table 2: Countries Coded “1” on Democratic Decentralization, Party Centralization
(Note: Only electorally competitive country-years included; coded “1” for 1975-2006 unless otherwise stated)
Albania (1992-2006), Argentina (1975, 1984-2006), Austria, Azerbaijan (2000-2006), Benin (2002-2006), Bolivia (19952006), Bosnia (2003-2006), Botswana, Bulgaria (1991-2006), Burkina Faso (1995-2006), Burundi (2005-2006),
Cambodia (2002-2006), Cameroon (1996-2006), Republic of Congo (1994-1997, 2003-2006), Costa Rica, Croatia (19932006), Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (1980-96), Egypt (1996-2006), El Salvador (1983-2006), Equatorial
Guinea (2000-2006), Estonia (1993-2006), Fiji (1975-1987, 1994-1997), Finland, France, Gabon (1997-2006), Gambia
(1975-1994, 1997-2006), Georgia (1993-1994, 1998-2006), Greece, Guatemala (1995-2006), Guinea (2005-2006),
Guyana (1994-2006), Haiti (1991, 1995-1997, 2001-2003, 2006), Honduras (1982-2006), Hungary (1991-2006), Israel,
Italy, Ivory Coast (2001-2006), Jamaica (1975-1983, 1987-2006), South Korea (1995-2006), Latvia (1994-2006),
Lebanon (1998-2006), Lesotho (2005-2006), Lithuania (1995-2006), Macedonia (1996-2006), Madagascar (1995-2006),
Malawi (2000-2005), Mali (1993-2006), Mexico, Moldova (1995-2006), Mongolia (2001-2006), Morocco (1997-2006),
Mozambique (1998-2006), Namibia (1992-2006), Nepal (1992-2001), Nicaragua (1990-2006), Niger (2004-2006),
Panama (1985-2006), Paraguay (1991-2006), Peru (1981-2006), Portugal (1977-2006), Romania (1992-2006), Russia
(2000-2006), Senegal (1990-2006), Sierra Leone (2004-2006), Slovak Republic (1993-2006), Slovenia (1994-2006),
Spain (1979-2006), Sri Lanka (1975-1990), Sweden, Taiwan (1993-2006), Tanzania (1996-2006), Thailand (1976, 19802006), Trinidad, Tunisia (1995-2006), Ukraine (1998-2006), United Kingdom, Uzbekistan (2000-2006), Venezuela,
Yemen (2001-2006), Yugoslavia (1993-2001), Zambia (1992-2006), Zimbabwe (1984-2006)
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Table 3: Results of the Primary Models
(Random Effects Models with AR1 Correction, World Region Dummies, and Decade Dummies)
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Y=
Primary
Completi
on Rate
(N=1548,
128
countries)

Democratic
Decentralization,
Party
Centralization
(Lagged)
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party
Decentralization
(Lagged)

Y=
Children
Out of
School
(N=1522,
128
countries)

Y=
Primary
School
Teachers
(N=1746,
133
countries)

Y= Primary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=2237,
135
countries)

Y= Ratio of
Girls to
Boys in
Primary
School
(N=1843,
133
countries)

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Y=DPT
Immunizations
(N=1506,
135
countries)

Y=Infant
Mortality
(N=1507,
135
countries)

Y=Public
Health
Expenditures
(N=1617,
135
countries)

Efficiency
Model

Efficiency
Model

Spending
Model

2.02**
(.972)

-1.13***
(.254)

.037*
(.021)

2.67***
(.666)

.258
(.333)

1.20
(1.08)

-.668**
(.285)

.253***
(.082)

.677
(1.29)

-.619*
(.339)

.036
(.029)

.414
(.858)

.040
(.457)

.019
(1.43)

-.172
(.402)

.040
(.119)

Municipal
Plurality
(Lagged)

1.31
(1.16)

.753**
(.299)

-.019
(.026)

-.079
(.793)

1.20
(1.14)

.204
(.312)

-.193**
(.096)

Municipal
Directly Elected
Executive
(Lagged)

-1.98**
(1.00)

.318
(.273)

-.010
(.023)

.078
(.728)

-.969
(1.14)

.264
(.331)

Fertility (Lagged)

-8.55***
(.719)

1.91***
(.202)

-.148***
(.020)

-5.04***
(.631)

-4.09***
(.333)

-9.01***
(.834)

10.2***
(.417)

-.155*
(.084)

Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)

4.75***
(1.08)

-1.05***
(.300)

.319***
(.032)

3.14***
(1.02)

1.34**
(.536)

-2.24**
(.934)

-7.04***
(.500)

.323***
(.102)

Logged
Population
Density (Lagged)
Regional
Elections
(Lagged)
Logged
Population
(Lagged)
Public Health
Expenditure
(Lagged)

.964
(.871)

-.228
(.239)

.017
(.032)

3.27***
(1.04)

.623
(.565)

1.56**
(.690)

-5.34***
(.752)

-.116
(.093)

-.788
(.988)

.652***
(.243)

-.022
(.019)

-1.82***
(.629)

-.414
(.344)

.074
(1.05)

-.238
(.283)

.064
(.087)

.094
(.745)

-.282
(.208)

-.018
(.028)

.772
(.902)

-.580
(.487)

-.101
(.628)

-1.54**
(.680)

-.015
(.083)

1.13***
(.287)

-.342***
(.079)

R²

.713

.567

.862

.648

.637

.290

-.104
(.415)

-.625*
(.376)

.531

-.085
(.094)

.479

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ªp<.20. All tests are 2-tailed. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Results of the First Robustness Checks
(Fixed Effects Models with AR1 Correction and Decade Dummies)
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Y=
Y=
Y=
Y=
Primary
Children
Primary
Primary
Completio
Out of
School
Enrolln Rate
School
Teachers ment Rate
(N=1420,
(N=1394,
(N=1613,
(N=2102,
122
119
129
133
countries) countries) countries) countries)

Democratic
Decentralization,
Party Centralization
(Lagged)
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party
Decentralization
(Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)
Municipal Directly
Elected Executive
(Lagged)

Model 5
Y= Ratio
of Girls to
Boys in
Primary
School
(N=1710,
128
countries)

Model 6
Y=DPT
Immunizations
(N=1371,
135
countries)

Model 7
Y=Infant
Mortality
(N=1372,
135
countries)

Model 8
Y=Public
Health
Expenditures
(N=1482,
135
countries)

Efficiency
Model

Efficiency
Model

Spending
Model

1.82*
(1.08)

-.650**
(.255)

.037*
(.021)

1.99***
(.633)

-.244
(.301)

.609
(1.30)

-.186
(.148)

.262***
(.089)

1.96ª
(1.47)

-.741**
(.354)

.054*
(.030)

.743
(.819)

.039
(.412)

.729
(1.87)

.066
(.213)

.001
(.136)

1.07
(1.29)

.731**
(.305)

-.028
(.026)

.319
(.744)

-.351
(1.15)

.114
(.287)

-.023
(.024)

.299
(.702)

-.027
(.370)
-.403
(.343)

.865
(1.42)
-.976
(1.54)

.056
(.163)
.112
(.174)

-.159ª
(.104)
-.071
(.108)

Fertility (Lagged)

-6.61***
(1.05)

1.85***
(.314)

-.095***
(.035)

-4.29***
(1.02)

-2.38***
(.535)

-9.62***
(1.75)

1.22***
(.430)

-.279**
(.138)

Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)

7.30***
(1.43)

-.871*
(.468)

.334***
(.040)

6.61***
(1.30)

-.736
(.663)

.045
(.065)

.402
(2.47)

1.26**
(.637)
1.73
(1.39)

1.52
(2.15)
5.32
(4.35)

-2.01***
(.400)
-7.19***
(2.03)

.634***
(.173)
.088
(.361)

.426*
(.239)
.625*
(.334)

-.021
(.020)
-.071**
(.029)

-2.02***
(.594)
3.33***
(1.02)

-.154
(.307)
5.09
(.524)

-1.48
(1.28)
4.80***
(1.70)
.517
(.366)

-.091
(.147)
4.59***
(.565)
-.051
(.042)

.043
(.094)
-.109
(.138)

.496

.607

.162

.056

.428

.233

.346

Logged Population
Density (Lagged)
Regional Elections
(Lagged)
Logged Population
(Lagged)
Public Health
Expenditure
(Lagged)
R²

-2.67ª
(1.89)
-1.25
(1.12)
3.21***
(.972)

.611

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ªp<.20. All tests are 2-tailed. Standard errors are in parenthesis
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Table 5: Results of the Second Robustness Checks
(Arellano-Bond System GMM Models with Robust Standard Errors and Decade Dummies)
Variable

Democratic
Decentralization,
Party Centralization
(Lagged)
Democratic
Decentralization,
Party
Decentralization
(Lagged)
Municipal Plurality
(Lagged)
Municipal Directly
Elected Executive
(Lagged)
Fertility (Lagged)

Model 1
Y=
Primary
Completion
Rate
(N=1303,
120
countries)

Model 2
Y=
Children
Out of
School
(N=1303,
117
countries)

Model 3
Y=
Primary
School
Teachers
(N=1533,
130
countries)

Model 4
Y=
Primary
Enrollment
Rate
(N=2103,
133
countries)

Model 5
Y= Ratio
of Girls to
Boys in
Primary
School
(N=1647,
127
countries)

Model 6
Y=DPT
Immunizations
(N=1504,
135
countries)

Model 7
Y=Infant
Mortality
(N=1507,
135
countries)

Model 8
Y=Public
Health
Expenditures
(N=1507,
135
countries)

Efficiency
Model

Efficiency
Model

Spending
Model

2.41***
(.907)

-.770***
(.279)

.003
(.009)

3.58***
(.915)

1.02***
(.312)

3.86***
(1.45)

-.853***
(.283)

.162**
(.066)

1.99*
(1.08)

-.716**
(.288)

-.009
(.012)

3.10***
(1.07)

.893***
(.330)

3.03*
(1.75)

-.938***
(.314)

.140*
(.080)

-.076
(.875)

.117
(.110)

-.004
(.006)

-2.19***
(.809)

-.552
(.540)

.046
(.099)

-.001
(.007)

.248
(.579)

-.343*
(.198)
-.171
(.155)

-.085
(1.04)
-.994
(.909)

.166
(.167)
.030
(.147)

-.058ª
(.042)
-.022
(.042)

-2.18***
(.742)
-1.37**
(.582)
-.061
(.293)
.908ª
(.612)
.170
(.209)

.339**
(.136)
.283**
(.129)
-.030
(.035)
-.225**
(.114)
-.038
(.052)

-.007ª
(.005)
.023ª
(.014)
-.003
(.003)
-.004
(.010)
.001
(.003)

-.516
(.454)
-1.65***
(.614)
.071
(.250)
1.06*
(.599)
.136
(.235)

-.229
(.200)
-.103
(.215)
.014
(.074)
.259ª
(.180)
-.155**
(.073)

-4.52***
(.718)
-4.95***
(.982)
.724*
(.432)
.830
(.975)
.007
(.360)
1.75***
(.531)

.410***
(.138)
.700***
(.146)
-.121*
(.068)
-.174
(.156)
-.025
(.054)
-.127ª
(.081)

.131***
(.042)
.238***
(.074)
.014
(.024)
.073*
(.041)
-.017
(.018)

Logged GDP per
capita (Lagged)
Logged Population
Density (Lagged)
Regional Elections
(Lagged)
Logged Population
(Lagged)
Public Health
Expenditure
(Lagged)
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10, ªp<.20. All tests are 2-tailed. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis
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